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THE RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY IN ARKANSAS AFTER MERGER
OF LAW AND EQUITY
John J. Watkins*
I. INTRODUCTION
In November 2000, Arkansas voters approved Amendment 80, which
rewrote virtually the entire judicial article of the Arkansas Constitution of
1874. One of the amendment's "fundamental purposes [was] the merger of
law and equity,"' a feat accomplished by abolishing courts of chancery and
establishing circuit courts as the state's trial courts of general jurisdiction.
This process also eliminated the separate probate courts. In the words of the
Arkansas Supreme Court, Amendment 80 was "a watershed event in the
history of the Judicial Department of this state."3
Previously, subject matter jurisdiction had been divided among the cir-
cuit, chancery, and probate courts, and these jurisdictional lines "forced
cases to be divided artificially and litigated separately in different courts."4
* William H. Enfield Professor of Law, University of Arkansas School of Law. The
author gratefully acknowledges a research grant from the University of Arkansas School of
Law in connection with the preparation of this article.
1. In re Implementation of Amendment 80: Admin. Plans Pursuant to Admin. Order
No. 14, 345 Ark. Adv. app. (June 28, 2001) (per curiam) [hereinafter In re Implementation of
Amendment 80]; see also Clark v. Farmers Exch., Inc., 347 Ark. 81, 83 n.1, 61 S.W.3d 140,
141 n.1 (2001) (stating that "law and equity have been merged"). The merged system is to be
contrasted with and distinguished from the prior practice in Arkansas during the period in
which separate chancery courts had not been created in all counties. In those counties, the
circuit court "was a court of dual jurisdiction, the judge presiding in one division or 'on the
law side' as a judge of a superior court of common law, and also sitting in chancery as judge
of a court of equity." Morgan Utils., Inc. v. Perry County, 183 Ark. 542, 547, 37 S.W.2d 74,
77 (1931). With the merger of law and equity, "there are not separate law and equity 'sides'
of the circuit court." In re Implementation of Amendment 80, supra.
2. ARK. CONST. amend. 80, § 6(A) ("Circuit Courts are established as the trial courts of
original jurisdiction of all justiciable matters not otherwise assigned pursuant to this Consti-
tution."). The amendment also establishes courts of limited jurisdiction, known as district
courts, as of January 1, 2005, and permits the continuation of city courts. Id. §§ 7, 19(B)(2).
Amendment 80 did not affect the exclusive jurisdiction of county courts over county taxes,
roads, and similar matters. Id. at art. VII, § 28.
3. In re Implementation of Amendment 80, supra note 1.
4. Id. Because a circuit court could not grant an injunction, Ark. State Game & Fish
Comm'n v. Sledge, 344 Ark. 504, 512, 42 S.W.3d 427, 431 (2001), and a chancery court
could not award punitive damages, Stolz v. Franklin, 258 Ark. 999, 1008, 531 S.W.2d 1, 7
(1975), a plaintiff could either (1) proceed in the chancery court for injunctive relief and
compensatory damages, thus waiving any claim for punitive damages, or (2) seek injunctive
relief in chancery court and punitive as well as compensatory damages in circuit court, a
tactic that not only added to the expense of litigation but also posed potential preclusion
problems. See, e.g., Nichols Bros. Invs. v. Rector-Phillips-Morse, Inc., 33 Ark. App. 47, 801
S.W.2d 308 (1990) (fraud claim in circuit court could have been litigated under cleanup
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The consolidation of subject matter jurisdiction in general5 and the merger
of law and equity in particular raise questions with respect to the right to
trial by jury. Because the Seventh Amendment of the United States Consti-
tution does not apply to the states,6 the parameters of this right are defined
solely by Arkansas law.
Under Article II, Section 7 of the state constitution, "[t]he right of trial
by jury shall remain inviolate, and shall extend to all cases at law, without
regard to the amount in controversy. 7 This provision was not amended or
repealed by Amendment 80; however, the Arkansas Supreme Court will be
required to determine its application in the new judicial system that the
amendment created. This article discusses one aspect of that issue: the right
to trial by jury in circuit court after the merger of law and equity.8
doctrine in prior chancery action and was therefore barred). By contrast, today's circuit
courts have available any remedy or combination of remedies. See ARK. R_ Civ. P. 18(a),
amended by Implementation of Amendment 80: Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure &
Inferior Court Rules, 345 Ark. Adv. app. (May 24, 2001) (per curiam) (stating party "may
join .. . as many claims, legal or equitable, as the party may have against an opposing
party"); Clark, 347 Ark. at 83 n. 1, 61 S.W.3d at 141 n.1 ("Because law and equity have been
merged, the circuit courts can award not only legal remedies, but also traditional equitable
remedies.") This has long been the case in other states. E.g., Rexnord, Inc. v. Ferris, 657 P.2d
673 (Or. 1983) (trial court can award injunctive relief and punitive damages in same action).
Another difficulty under the former system was presented by the limited jurisdiction of
the probate court. For example, such a court could not hear a tort counterclaim by the estate
of an incapacitated person, In re Estate of Morgan, 310 Ark. 220, 833 S.W.2d 776 (1992), or
decide dispute over title to real property between a decedent's personal representative and a
"stranger" to the estate, Hilburn v. First State Bank, 259 Ark. 569, 535 S.W.2d 810 (1976).
These matters, which would have been heard in the circuit and chancery courts, respectively,
can now be decided in a single proceeding.
5. Section 6(B) of Amendment 80 authorizes the supreme court to promulgate rules
governing the organization of circuit courts into "subject matter divisions." Pursuant to this
authority, the court has required each circuit court to establish the following divisions: crimi-
nal, civil, juvenile, probate, and domestic relations. Administrative Order No. 14, para. 1(a),
344 Ark. app. 744, 747 (2001). However, "[t]he designation of divisions is for the purpose of
judicial administration and caseload management and is not for the purpose of subject-matter
jurisdiction." Id.
6. City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 719 (1999);
Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415,432 (1996); Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S.
189, 192 n.6 (1974); Minneapolis & St. Louis RR. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211, 217
(1916).
7. ARK. CONST. art. II, § 7. The only reference to jury trials in Amendment 80 appears
in a section authorizing the supreme court to "prescribe the rules of pleading, practice and
procedure for all courts," with the proviso that these rules must "preserve the right of trial by
jury as declared in this Constitution." Id. at amend. 80, § 3.
8. By statute, there is no right to jury trial in municipal courts, now known as district
courts. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-17-703 (LEXIS Repl. 1999). This statute also provides that
"[iln order that the right to trial by jury remain inviolate, all appeals from judgment in mu-
nicipal court shall be de novo to circuit court." Id. Because a jury trial can be demanded in
the de novo proceeding, the right to trial by jury "is sufficiently protected by the right to take
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The language of Article II, Section 7--"shall remain inviolate"--
plainly suggests that the scope of the right to trial by jury is to be deter-
mined on the basis of history, and prior to Amendment 80 Arkansas main-
tained either separate courts of law and equity or single trial courts with
distinct law and equity "sides." In the merged system, the question is
whether the constitution requires a jury trial in cases which, prior to merger,
would have been heard without one. There is no problem, of course, if the
case presents only equitable issues-no constitutional right to a jury trial
exists in this situation.9 A much more difficult question is the scope of the
right in "mixed" cases involving both legal and equitable issues, and the
answer hinges on whether the supreme court adopts a rigidly historical view
of Article II, Section 7, or chooses a more flexible approach. There is sup-
port in the case law for both positions.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Blackstone wrote that "the trial by jury ever has been, and I trust ever
will be, looked upon as the glory of the English law."' ° Although doubt
remains as to the jury's origins," the early English jury was "a body of
the case to a circuit court." State v. Roberts, 321 Ark. 31, 35, 900 S.W.2d 175, 176 (1995).
The requirement that one who appeals to circuit court pay a filing fee is not an unconstitu-
tional burden on the right to jury trial. "The fee is not being imposed because [the appellant]
wants a jury trial. It is simply a filing fee that is collected no matter whether he is tried by a
jury or by the judge or even if the prosecution ends without any trial at all." Neeley v. Bar-
ber, 288 Ark. 384, 386, 706 S.W.2d 358, 359 (1986).
9. E.g., McKee v. Am. Trust Co., 166 Ark. 481, 266 S.W. 293 (1924) (action for in-
junctive relief); Hinkle v. Hinkle, 55 Ark. 583, 18 S.W. 1049 (1892) (action for specific
performance of contract). By contrast, there is a right to trial by jury if the only issues are
legal. E.g., McClanahan v. Gibson, 296 Ark. App. 304, 756 S.W.2d 889 (1988) (tort action
for damages); Weaver v. Ark. Nat'l Bank, 73 Ark. 462, 84 S.W. 510 (1905) (suit on promis-
sory note where issues "were purely legal"); see also Ashley v. Little Rock, 56 Ark. 370,
375, 19 S.W. 1058, 1059 (1892) (right to jury trial "extends to all cases in which legal rights
are to be ascertained and determined, in contradistinction to those where equitable rights
alone were recognized and equitable remedies administered"). The Fifth Circuit has de-
scribed the inquiry as follows:
In an action where a single claim is presented and a single remedy demanded,
the action can rationally be classified as one which historically would have been
either legal or equitable. In such a case, the proper approach to deciding whether
a [party] has a right to a jury trial is whether the action is "legal" or "equitable."
Similarly, where the case presents several claims or demands more than one
remedy,.., the matter is no more difficult than in a simple suit if the claims, or
the remedies, are either all legal or all equitable.
Swofford v. B&W, Inc., 336 F.2d 406, 409 (5th Cir. 1964) (internal citations and emphasis
omitted).
10. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *379.
11. The traditional view is that the jury was brought to England by the Normans. JAMES
B. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 50 (1898); Rich-
2002]
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neighbours... summoned by some public officer to give upon oath a true
answer to some question.' ', 2 William the Conqueror used this technique in
1086 "to extract from his conquered subjects the great fund of information
compiled in Domesday Book.' 3 The jury's role was largely confined to
such administrative matters until Henry II came to the throne in 1154. He
"made the group inquest a standard feature of certain criminal and civil pro-
ceedings."'
14
The jury was apparently first used in civil adjudication with respect to
complaints of tenants who claimed to have been "disseised, that is dispos-
sessed, of [their] free tenement unjustly."'15 This procedure-the "assize of
novel disseisin"-was an alternative to trial by battle and thus attractive to
the litigants.' 6 Use of the jury as a fact-finding body was subsequently ex-
tended to "a great variety of civil and criminal proceedings during a period
of innovation and experiment that lasted far into the thirteenth century."
'1 7
The Magna Carta, signed by King John in 1215, provided that "[n]o free
man shall be taken or imprisoned or disseised or outlawed or exiled or in
any wise destroyed, save by the lawful judgment of his peers or the law of
the land."' 8
During its early years, the jury's function was "to serve as a means of
gathering evidence by calling those who were familiar with the facts in is-
sue," 19 and for that reason jurors were drawn from the area where the land at
issue was located or the events in question took place.20 Over time, how-
ever, the jury was "transform[ed] . . . from a body of witnesses to a body
before whom witnesses should appear and present evidence." 2' By the mid-
1500s, the roles of jurors and witnesses were completely separate in most
cases.
22
ard S. Arnold, Trial by Jury: The Constitutional Right to a Jury of Twelve in Civil Trials, 22
HOFSTR.A L. REv. 1, 6-7 (1993).
12. 1 SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD 1138 (2d ed. 1898).
13. JOHN P. DAWSON, A HISTORY OF LAY JUDGES 119 (1960).
14. Id. at 121.
15. 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 12, at 146. The first recorded use of a jury in
an English court occurred between 1083 and 1086 in a civil case involving a disputed land
title. Id. at 143-44.
16. The jury's popularity was speeded along by the Lateran Council of 1215, when it
issued an ecclesiastical condemnation of trials by battle and ordeal. DAWSON, supra note 13,
at 121-22.
17. Id. at 121.
18. 1 POLLOCK& MAITLAND, supra note 12, at 171-72.
19. Arnold, supra note 11, at 7.
20. THAYER, supra note 11, at 90-91.
21. Jack Pope, The Jury, 39 TEX. L. REv. 426, 439 (1961); see also 2 POLLOCK &
MAITLAND, supra note 12, at 622-26.
22. Stephan Landsman, The Civil Jury in America: Scenes from an Unappreciated
(Vol. 24
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This development may have been hastened by the rise of the chancery
courts, in which witnesses offered testimony during trials. 23 In the thirteenth
century, the King and his Privy Council entertained petitions when a rem-
edy in the common law courts was unavailable. Throughout most of the
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the King's chancellor, a member of the
Council, acted on these petitions along with or under the direction of the
Council. The precise point at which the chancellor began to act independ-
ently is not clear, but by the sixteenth century he headed a separate chancery
court.24 By 1550, this court acted in cases in which the strict rules of the
common law would lead to inequitable results.25 Although the chancellor
heard other cases as well, 26 it was his intervention, usually by injunction, in
the name of equity that "invoked the greatest enmity of the common law
judges.' 27 The dispute came to a head during the reign of James I, who "de-
cided the matter in favour of the Chancery. 28
Chancery jurisdiction came to be classified as exclusive, concurrent,
and auxiliary. In the first category, equity created and enforced rights un-
known in the courts of law. Examples include uses and trusts. In the exer-
cise of concurrent jurisdiction, the chancellor fashioned new remedies to
enforce rights recognized at common law but for which the law courts did
not afford an adequate legal remedy. In contract cases, for instance, equity
would act when the remedy at law-damages-was deemed inadequate.
Auxiliary jurisdiction existed when the substantive right was recognized at
common law but equitable relief was necessary because the law courts had
no procedure for proof of the right. The bill of discovery is an example.29 In
1892, the Arkansas Supreme Court described the jurisdiction of the state's
History, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 579, 586-87 (1993).
23. Pope, supra note 21, at 441.
24. The first lawyer to serve as Lord Chancellor was Sir Thomas More in 1529. Equity
"took a great stride forward during his administration." Garrard Glenn & Kenneth R. Red-
den, Equity: A Visit to the Founding Fathers, 31 VA. L. REv: 753, 779 (1945) (quoting I
SCOTT ON TRUSTS § 1.1 (1939)). The succeeding chancellors have been described as "men of
lesser importance." THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW
697 (5th ed. 1956).
25. Morton Gitelman, The Separation of Law and Equity and the Arkansas Chancery
Courts: Historical Anomalies and Political Realities, 17 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 215, 216-
28 (1995).
26. During this period the chancery court also dealt with uses of land, enforcement of
contracts, and matters of account. Id. at 224.
27. Id.
28. HAROLD GREVILLE HANBURY, MODERN EQUITY: THE PRINICPLES OF EQUITY 12
(1935).
29. See HENRY L. MCCLINTOCK, HANDBOOK OF THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY § 40 (1936);
1 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 136 (4th ed. 1918); EDMUND H.T.
SNELL, PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 13-14 (Robert Megarry & P.V. Baker eds. 1973).
2002]
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equity courts "[als practically the same as that of the Federal courts, and the
High Court of Chancery in England.
30
As the great dispenser of justice, the chancellor sat without a jury. And
under what came to be known, at least in the United States, as the cleanup
doctrine, 31 he could hear "matters which were ordinarily the subject of ju-
risdiction at law"32 and would have been tried to a jury. This was so whether
equity jurisdiction was exclusive, 33 concurrent,34 or auxiliary.3 5 When the
chancery court "obtained jurisdiction over some portion or feature of a con-
troversy, it [would] . . . proceed to decide the whole issues, and to award
complete relief, although the rights of the parties are strictly legal, and the
final remedy granted [was] of the kind which might be conferred by a court
of law."
36
In America, the right to a jury trial was first codified in the 1641 Mas-
sachusetts Body of Liberties. 37 "[D]epriving us, in many cases, of the bene-
fits of Trial by Jury" was among the grievances later set forth in the Decla-
ration of Independence,38 and the right to a jury trial "was probably the only
one universally secured by the first American state constitutions. 3 9 Despite
30. Ashley v. Little Rock, 56 Ark. 370, 375, 19 S.W. 1058, 1059 (1892).
31. See, e.g., 9 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE § 2302.1 (1995); A. Leo Levin, Equitable Clean-Up and the Jury: A Suggested
Orientation, 100 U. PA. L. REv. 320 (1951).
32. 13 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND 10 (1910).
33. E.g., Yates v. Hambly, 26 Eng. Rep. 618 (Ch. 1742) (redemption of mortgage, eject-
ment).
34. E.g., Denton v. Stewart, 29 Eng. Rep. 1156 (Ch. 1786) (specific performance, dam-
ages).
35. E.g., Parker v. Dee, 22 Eng. Rep. 910 (Ch. 1674) (discovery).
36. 1 POMEROY, supra note 29, § 231.
37. Kenneth S. Klein, The Myth of How to Interpret the Seventh Amendment Right to a
Civil Jury Trial, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1005, 1008 (1992). However, the Virginia Company's
1606 charter from James I incorporated the right to jury trial, and by 1624, juries were avail-
able for all civil and criminal cases in Virginia. Arnold, supra note 11, at 13; Landsman,
supra note 22, at 592.
38. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 20 (U.S. 1776), reprinted in I FRANCIS
NEWTON THORPE, THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND
OTHER ORGANIC LAWS 5 (1909). A year earlier, the Second Continental Congress had chal-
lenged Parliament's adoption of statutes "depriving us of the accustomed and inestimable
privilege of trial by jury, in cases affecting both life and property." DECLARATION OF THE
CAUSES AND NECESSITY OF TAKING UP ARMS para. 3 (1775), reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR
LIBERTIES 295 (Richard L. Perry & John C. Cooper eds., 1959).
39. LEONARD W. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN
EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY 281 (1960). The Articles of Confederation, which did not provide
for a national judiciary, gave Congress the authority to set up courts for the trial of piracies
and felonies on the high seas and-to establish an appeals court for dealing with prizes and
captures. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IX (U.S. 1777), reprinted in I THORPE, supra
note 38, at 12-15. The power to create courts for piracies and felonies was never exercised.
Prize cases were initially contested in the state courts, whose judgments were appealable to
[Vol. 24
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this backdrop, "it is remarkable to observe the Constitutional Convention of
1787 winding toward the conclusion of its business.., without making any
provision for civil jury trial in the new federal courts., 40 Records of the
convention reflect that the issue was considered only in its last five days.
Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts (whose motion to have a committee pre-
pare a bill of rights had previously been defeated) and Charles Pinckney of
South Carolina had moved to amend the proposed judicial article by adding
that "a trial by jury shall be preserved as usual in civil cases," but the mo-
tion failed in the face of objections that "[t]he constitution of Juries is dif-
ferent in different States and the trial itself is usual in different cases in dif-
ferent States." 41
During the debate over ratification, the Constitution was criticized for
inadequately protecting individual liberties, among them the right to a jury
trial in civil cases. As Professor Charles W. Wolfram has pointed out, the
Anti-Federalists advanced several arguments in favor of trial by jury: "the
protection of debtor defendants; the frustration of unwise legislation; the
overturning of the practices of courts of vice-admiralty; the vindication of
the interests of private citizens in litigation with the government; and the
protection of litigants against overbearing and oppressive judges. ' 42 Under-
lying these arguments, Professor Wolfram added, is the promise that the
jury, "through its ability to disregard substantive rules of law, . . . would
reach a result that the judge either could not or would not reach.
'
,43
the appellate body created by Congress. During its existence, the appeals court heard fifty-
two appeals and issued eight opinions. DAVID W. ROBERTSON, ADMIRALTY AND FEDERALISM
100-01 (1970). The statute creating this tribunal provided that "the mode of trial shall be in
accordance with the usages of nations, and not by jury." Id. at 100. However, several prize
cases were tried to juries in the state courts even though they "came within the admiralty
jurisdiction and would not have been tried to a jury either in England or under the later prac-
tice in the federal courts after adoption of the seventh amendment." Charles W. Wolfram,
The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REV. 639, 655 (1973).
40. Wolfram, supra note 39, at 656. The delegates may have largely ignored the jury
trial issue because of more urgent concerns. They were "deeply troubled by recent events in
the country," including the Massachusetts taxpayer revolt known as Shays' Rebellion, and
were "committed to creating a strong national government that would put an end to the threat
of anarchy." Landsman, supra note 22, at 597. Moreover, "[a]fter months of debate and
tinkering with the broad shape and powers of the federal government, the delegates were
doubtless under a great deal of pressure to complete the task they had been sent to perform."
Arnold, supra note 11, at 15.
41. James Madison, Debates in the Federal Convention, reprinted in 2 MAX FARRAND,
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 628 (1911) (emphasis in original). The
debate is set out in Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 153-55 & n.8 (1973). See also Parklane
Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 339-44 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (summarizing
history of the Seventh Amendment).
42. Wolfram, supra note 39, at 670-71.
43. Id. at 671.
20021
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The First Congress responded to the criticism by proposing the consti-
tutional amendments that became the Bill of Rights.44 James Madison intro-
duced two suggested amendments to Article III to address trial by jury. The
first dealt with appellate review and stated, in part, that "nor shall any fact
triable by jury, according to the course of common law, be otherwise re-
examinable than may consist with the principles of common law. ' 5 The
second provided that "[i]n suits at common law, between man and man, the
trial by jury, as one of the best securities to the rights of the people, ought to
remain inviolate.' 46 The latter was apparently based on the declaration of
rights that Madison's home state of Virginia had adopted at its ratification
convention.47
As refined during the legislative process, the Madison proposals be-
came what is now the Seventh Amendment:
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact
tried by a jury shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United
States, than according to the rules of the common law.48
What little exists by way of legislative history sheds no light on the
amendment's meaning, and almost nothing is known about the debates over
the Bill of Rights in the state legislatures that ratified it.
49
As noted previously, the states had adopted their own constitutional
provisions regarding trial by jury. With respect to their court systems, the
states did not uniformly follow the English model by creating separate
courts of law and equity. 50 One explanation for the departure is that equity
44. See 1 Stat. 97 (1789).
45. 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 452 (1789).
46. Id. at 453.
47. Wolfram, supra note 39, at 728 n.258. The Virginia declaration stated that "in con-
troversies respecting property, and in suits between man and man, the ancient trial by jury is
one of the greatest securities to the rights of the people, and [is] to remain sacred and invio-
lable." 3 JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 658 (Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott Co., 2d ed.
1891).
48. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
49. Wolfram, supra note 39, at 726-30.
50. During the debate over ratification of the Constitution, Alexander Hamilton offered
this description of state court systems:
In [New York] our judicial establishments resemble more nearly, than in any
other, those of Great Britain. We have courts of common law, courts of probates
... ['] a court of admiralty, and a court of chancery.... In New-Jersey, there is a
court of chancery which proceeds like ours, but neither courts of admiralty, nor
of probates .... In Pennsylvania ... there is no court of chancery. . . [,] and its
common law courts have equity jurisdiction. It has a court of admiralty, but none
of probates, at least on the plan of ours. Delaware has in these respects imitated
[Vol. 24
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was viewed with hostility by many Americans, who feared the power of
judges and considered equity a prerogative of the kind that had no place in a
democratic society. 5' Subsequently, this stigma seemed to disappear, and
more states established separate chancery courts or created within their trial
courts a division or "side" with equity jurisdiction.52 The latter system pre-
vailed in the federal courts. 3
After a period of inefficiency and scandal, Parliament abolished the
separate chancery court in England, consolidating it and all other courts into
a single tribunal-the High Court of Justice-with both law and equity
powers.54 In the United States, the movement toward merging the law and
chancery courts began in earnest with New York's famous Field Code of
1848. 55 Its two most prominent features were the abolition of the common
law forms of action and the merger of law and equity. 56 The code was
Pennsylvania. Maryland approaches more nearly to New-York, as does also Vir-
ginia .... North Carolina bears most affinity to Pennsylvania; South-Carolina to
Virginia .... In Georgia there are none but common law courts .... In Connecti-
cut they have no distinct courts, either of chancery or of admiralty [and their] ...
common law courts have admiralty, and to a certain extent, equity jurisdic-
tion..... Rhode Island is I believe in this particular pretty much in the situation
of Connecticut. Massachusetts and New-Hampshire, in regard to the blending of
law, equity and admiralty jurisdictions are in a similar predicament.
THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 565-66 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
51. Joseph H. Beale, Equity in America, I CAMBRIDGE L.J. 21, 22-23 (1921); Robert
von Moschsisker, Equity Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 75 U. PA. L. REv. 287, 288
(1927).
52. See I JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 57, 58 (6th ed.
1853); see also GEORGE L. CLARK, EQUITY § 6 (1919) (describing equity jurisdiction in the
several states); 4 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 179-82, n.(d) (11 th ed.
1867) (same).
53. See, e.g., Liberty Oil Co. v. Condon Nat'l Bank, 260 U.S. 235, 241 (1922); W.
Union Tel. Co. v. Pa. R.R. Co., 195 U.S. 594, 595 (1904); Scott v. Nealy, 140 U.S. 106, 110-
11 (1891). Equity Rule 22 provided that "[i]f at any time it appear that a suit commenced in
equity should have been brought as an action on the law side of the court, it shall be forth-
with transferred to the law side and be there proceeded with, with only such alteration in the
pleadings as shall be essential." Rules of Practice for the Courts of Equity of the United
States, 226 U.S. app. 629, 654 (1912).
54. Judicature Act of 1873, 36 & 37 Vict., c. 66; see Pugh v. Heath, 7 App. Cas. 235,
237 (1882) ("The Court is now not a Court of Law or a Court of Equity; it is a Court of com-
plete jurisdiction.").
55. Texas, upon its admission to the Union in 1845, was the first state to merge law and
equity. Leonard J. Emmerglick, A Century of the New Equity, 23 TEx. L. REv. 244, 244 n. 1
(1945). The New York code was largely the work of David Dudley Field, one of three com-
missioners appointed pursuant to a statute and directed to "revise, reform, simplify, and
abridge" the practice and pleadings of the state's courts. CHARLES E. CLARK, LAW OF CODE
PLEADING § 7 (2d ed. 1947) (quoting N.Y. CONST. art. 6, § 2 (1846)); see also Mildred V.
Coe & Lewis W. Morse, Chronology of the Development of the David Dudley Field Code, 27
CORNELL L.Q. 238 (1942).
56. See, e.g., Charles E. Clark, The Union of Law and Equity, 25 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 10
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enormously influential and served as the model for procedural reform across
the country.57 At the federal level, merger was accomplished in 1938 when
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure went into effect.58
In Arkansas, the right to trial by jury has been established since the ter-
ritorial period that began in 1803, when France ceded to the United States
the lands commonly known as the "Louisiana Purchase."59 Arkansas was
part of the Louisiana Territory from 1803 to 1812, part of the Missouri Ter-
ritory from 1812 to 1819, and a separate territory from 1819 until statehood
in 1836.60 An analysis of the right to jury trial in the Arkansas Territory
requires examining the acts of Congress creating not only that territory, but
also the territories of Louisiana and Missouri.
In 1804, Congress split the Louisiana Purchase area into two territo-
ries.61 The lower portion, what is now the State of Louisiana, was desig-
nated as the Territory of Orleans, 62 with the remaining lands called the Dis-
trict of Louisiana.63 The name of the latter was changed to the Territory of
Louisiana in 18 05 .64 Congress provided for trial by jury in both. With re-
spect to the Territory of Louisiana, the statute provided that "in all civil
cases of the value of one hundred dollars, the trial shall be by jury, if either
of the parties require it.
' 65
(1925) ("The union of law and equity is justly considered to be the foundation principle of
the Code reform.").
57. See CHARLES M. HEPBURN, THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CODE PLEADING IN
AMERICA AND ENGLAND § § 122, 140 (1897).
58. See FED. R. Civ. P. 2 ("There shall be one form of action to be known as 'civil
action."'). As the Supreme Court observed, "[u]nder the rules, law and equity are proce-
durally combined; nothing turns now upon the form of the action or the procedural devices
by which the parties happen to come before the court." Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 540
(1970). See generally 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3 1, § 1042.
59. Treaty Ceding Louisiana, Oct. 21, 1803, U.S.-Fr., reprinted in 3 THORPE, supra note
38, at 1359.
60. Gitelman, supra note 25, at 235-36.
61. Act of Mar. 26, 1804, ch. 38,2 Stat. 283.
62. Id. § l, 2 Stat. at 283.
63. Id. § 12, 2 Stat. at 287. New Orleans was the capital of the Territory of Orleans, and
the District of Louisiana was put under control of the territorial government of Indiana. Be-
cause Indiana was in the early stages of territorial development and did not have an elected
legislature, "the people living in what are now the states of Arkansas and Missouri were
subject to laws enacted by the governor and three judges meeting in Vincennes, on the Wa-
bash River in which is now southwest Indiana." S. CHARLES BOLTON, ARKANSAS 1800-1860,
at 24 (1998).
64. Act of Mar. 3, 1805, ch. 31, § 1, 2 Stat. 331.
65. Act of Mar. 26, 1804, ch. 38, § 12, 2 Stat. at 287. As to the Territory of Orleans, the
statute provided that "in all cases criminal and civil in the superior court, the trial shall be by
a jury, if either of the parties require it." Id. § 5, 2 Stat. at 284.
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When the Territory of Orleans became the State of Louisiana in 1812,
the Territory of Louisiana was redesignated as the Missouri Territory." The
act of Congress expressly provided for trial by jury in criminal cases 67 but
not in civil matters. However, the statute also stated that "the people of the
said territory shall always be entitled to ... judicial proceedings according
to the common law and the laws and usages in force in the said territory.' 68
The phrase "judicial proceedings according to the common law" may have
been intended to include the right to trial by jury in civil cases. 69 In any
event, the "laws and usages in force" in the Louisiana Territory called for a
jury trial in civil cases-which Congress had expressly provided,70 as had
the territorial legislature7 '-and the right continued to be guaranteed in the
renamed territory.
In 1819, Congress carved the Arkansas Territory out of the Missouri
Territory72 and continued in effect the laws of the latter "until modified or
repealed by the legislative authority" of the new government.73 As its first
66. Act of June 4, 1812, ch. 95, § 1, 2 Stat. 743. The following year, the Missouri terri-
torial legislature "created a separate Arkansas County with its administrative center at Ar-
kansas Post." BOLTON, supra note 63, at 25.
67. Act of June 4, 1812, ch. 95, § 14, 2 Stat. at 747.
68. Id.
69. Similar language appeared in the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, which granted
inhabitants of the Northwest Territory the right to "judicial proceedings according to the
course of the common law." Act of July 13, 1787, art. II, reprinted in 2 THORPE, supra note
38, at 960-61. However, the ordinance also expressly provided that "[t]he inhabitants of the
said territory shall always be entitled to the benefits of... trial by jury." Id. It has been sug-
gested that the phrase guaranteeing "judicial proceedings 'according to the course of the
common law"' included the right of trial by jury. People v. Bigge, 285 N.W. 5, 7 (Mich.
1939) (Potter, J., concurring); see also Weaver v. Ark. Nat'l Bank, 73 Ark. 462, 463, 84
S.W.2d 510, 510 (1905) (issues in suit on promissory note "were purely legal, and appellant
had a constitutional right to trial by the course of the common law, including trial by jury").
Some courts read the two quoted phrases together; that is, trial by jury must be according to
the common law. E.g., Reynolds v. State, 61 Ind. 392 (1878); La Bowe v. Balthazor, 193
N.W. 244 (Wis. 1923).
70. Act of Mar. 26, 1804, ch. 38, § 12, 2 Stat. at 287. It should also be noted that this
statute was not completely superseded by the Missouri legislation. See Act of June 4, 1812,
ch. 95, § 16, 2 Stat. at 747 (repealing "so much of" 1804 act "as is repugnant to this act").
71. The territorial statute had provided that "in civil cases the trial shall be by a jury, if
either of the parties require it, and in all cases where neither of the parties shall require a jury,
the law and the fact shall be determined and damages assessed by the court." Eckrich v. St.
Louis Transit Co., 75 S.W. 755, 760 (Mo. 1903) (quoting Act of Oct. 1, 1804, 1 Terr. Laws
56).
72. Act of Mar. 2, 1819, ch. 49, § 1, 3 Stat. 493. The new territory included but was
larger than what had been Arkansas County of the Missouri Territory. MORRIS S. ARNOLD,
UNEQUAL LAWS UNTO A SAVAGE RACE 174-77 (1985). Specifically, it covered much of what
is now Oklahoma and shared a boundary with Mexico. The modem western boundary was
"established as Congress created the Indian Territory that would become Oklahoma."
BOLTON, supra note 63, at 11.
73. Act of Mar. 2, 1819, ch. 49, § 10, 3 Stat. at 495.
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act, that government expressly adopted the territorial laws of Missouri.7 4
Thus, by the time that Congress made Arkansas a state in 1836,75 the right
to trial by jury in civil cases had long been established within its bounda-
ries.76 For example, a compilation of the laws of the Arkansas Territory,
published in 1835, included the following:
If any party to a suit now depending or hereafter to be commenced
in any court of record in this territory shall at any time before the trial of
such cause by himself or counsel, require a trial by jury, the court before
whom the suit is depending shall cause a jury to be empannelled for the
trial thereof.
In all cases where neither party shall require a jury, the law and the
facts may be determined by the court; or the court if they shall think
proper may refer such cause to three or more indifferent and competent
persons, whose report, if approved of by the court, shall have the same
effect as a verdict given by twelve men.
7 7
74. Act of Aug. 3, 1819, 1819 Ark. Terr. Acts 70, reprinted in WILLIAM E. WOODRUFF,
LAWS OF THE TERRITORY OF ARKANSAS 1819-1820 (1824). The act, adopted by the territorial
secretary and the three judges of its superior court, provided that "all the laws and parts of
laws now in existence in the territory of Missouri, which are of a public and general and not
of a local nature, and which are not repugnant to the provisions of the original law of this
territory ... shall be and continue in force" in the Arkansas Territory. Id. The secretary of the
new territory, Robert Crittenden, acted in place of its governor, James Miller, who did not
arrive in the capital, Arkansas Post, until December 26, 1819. See BOLTON, supra note 63, at
27-28. Crittenden was the dominant political figure for the first five years of the territory's
history. Miller, who resigned in December 1924, was present in the territory less than half
the time he held the governor's office. Id. at 28-29. Two of the original superior court judges
left Arkansas before assuming the bench, having found "frontier life in the territory too rug-
ged and severe." Oscar Fendler, The Arkansas Judicial System at the Crossroads, 17 ARK. L.
REv. 259, 261 (1963).
75. Act of June 15, 1836, ch. 99, § 1, 5 Stat. 50.
76. The conditions under which jurors performed their duties during the territorial pe-
riod were rather primitive. Professor Bolton has provided the following description of a jury
trial in a criminal case at Perryville:
The town contained only one store, and the court was held in the home of the
postmaster, who was also a ferryman. The judge, a prosecuting attorney, and at
least one other lawyer had ridden out from Little Rock to conduct the legal pro-
ceedings. They sat around two tables pushed together for the occasion, and the
jury of local landowners occupied a bench along one wall. After hearing the evi-
dence and arguments in an assault cause, the twelve men retired to deliberate in
a stable. Normally they would have gone outside, but it was raining.
BOLTON, supra note 63, at 44.
77. J. STEELE & J. M'CAMPBELL, LAWS OF ARKANSAS TERRITORY 328 (1835); see also
HENRY S. GEYER, DIGEST OF LAWS OF THE TERRITORY OF MISSOURI 256 (1818). There are a
number of reported cases in which trial had been by jury. E.g., Collins v. Johnson, 6 F. Cas.
131 (Ark. Terr. 1835) (No. 3,015a) (debt); Scott v. Doe, 21 F. Cas. 826 (Ark. Ter. 1835)
(No. 12,528a) (ejectment); Dillingham v. Skein, 7 F. Cas. 707 (Ark. Ter. 1832) (No. 3,912a)
(open account); Mirick v. Hemphill, 17 F. Cas. 476 (Ark. Ter. 1832) (No. 9,647a) (detinue);
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Another statute provided that, in justice of the peace courts, "if the sum
demanded [in small debt cases] exceed ten dollars either party shall have a
right upon application therefor to a trial by jury.., of six good and lawful
free white male persons. 78
Apart from statutory guarantees, the Seventh Amendment was applica-
ble in the territories. Although this issue had not been definitively resolved
when Arkansas became a state in 1836, the Constitution seems clear on the
point. Article IV, Section 3 gives Congress authority to "make all needful
Rules and Regulations" for the territories, and the Bill of Rights is "a limita-
tion on all congressional power., 79 As Justice Story wrote in .his 1833
Commentaries on the Constitution, Congress "may confer upon [a territory]
general legislative powers, subject only to the laws and constitution of the
United States." 80 This view was adopted by the United States Supreme
Court as early as 1850 in Webster v. Reid.81
Scull v. Roane, 21 F. Cas. 894 (Ark. Terr. 1831) (No. 12,570c) (assumpsit); Woodruff v.
Bentley, 30 F. Cas. 521 (Ark. Terr. 1831) (No. 17,986a) (detinue); Scull v. Higgins, 21 F.
Cas. 894 (Ark. Terr. 1829) (No. 12,750a) (breach of contract); Davis v. Pitman, 7 F. Cas. 163
(Ark. Terr. 1826) (No. 3,647a) (trespass); Murphy v. Tindall, 17 F. Cas. 1040 (Ark. Terr.
1822) (No. 9,952a) (replevin); Blakely v. Ruddell, 30 F. Cas. 967 (Ark. Ter. 1822) (No. 18,
241) (trover). In other cases, the parties had a right to a jury but consented to a bench trial.
E.g., Hartfield v. Patton, 11 F. Cas. 698 (Ark. Terr. 1835) (No. 6,158a) (covenant); Pelham v.
Pace, 19 F. Cas. 125 (Ark. Terr. 1833) (No. 10,91 la) (assumpsit); Archer v. Morehouse, 30
F. Cas. 952 (Ark. Terr. 1832) (No. 18,225) (debt).
78. STEELE & M'CAMPBELL, supra note 77, at 370; see Miles v. James, 17 F. Cas. 284
(Ark. Terr. 1831) (No. 9,543a) (justice of the peace erred in trying case without jury where
plaintiff had sought $17.95). Having been decided four years before the 1835 compilation of
Arkansas territorial laws was published, the Miles case quoted from a compilation of Mis-
souri laws prepared in 1818. See GEYER, supra note 77, at 387. The Arkansas Superior Court
cited Mr. Geyer's digest in other cases as well. See, e.g., Bentley v. Sevier, 30 F. Cas. 963
(Ark. Ter. 1834) (No. 18,233); Janes v. Buzzard, 13 F. Cas. 346 (Ark. Terr. 1834) (No.
7,206b); Murphy v. Byrd, 17 F. Cas. 1032 (Ark. Terr. 1833) (No. 9,947a); Campbell v.
Clark, 4 F. Cas. 1160 (Ark. Terr. 1828) (No. 2,355a).
79. David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: Jefferson and the West, 1801-1809,
39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1441, 1481 (1998).
80. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 667
(1833).
81. 52 U.S. (11 How.) 437 (1850). There, Justice McLean relied on the Seventh
Amendment to invalidate an act of the Iowa territorial legislature providing for bench trials
in civil actions involving certain property. Id. at 460. The Court also relied on the statute
establishing the Iowa Territory, which "by express provision and by reference, extended the
laws of the United States, including the [Northwest] Ordinance of 1787, over the Territory,
so far as they are applicable." Id. As mentioned previously, the ordinance guaranteed inhabi-
tants of the territory the right to trial by jury. See supra note 69. Six years later, in the Dred
Scott case, Chief Justice Taney concluded that the Constitution in general, and the Bill of
Rights in particular, bound Congress in legislating for the territories. Scott v. Sandford, 60
U.S. (19 How.) 393, 450-51 (1856). None of the Justices indicated any disagreement with the
Chief Justice on this point, and the dissenters expressly agreed with him. Justice McLean, the
author of Webster, asserted that "the Constitution was formed for our whole country." Id. at
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Since becoming a state in 1836, Arkansas has had five constitutions,
dated 1836, 1861, 1864, 1868, and 1874.82 The first was framed to satisfy
the requirements for statehood, and the second was designed primarily to
take the state into the Confederacy. The 1864 constitution formalized the
federal military government set up toward the end of the Civil War, while
the 1868 document-known as the "carpetbag constitution"-was the
framework for Reconstruction. The constitution of 1874, adopted largely as
a reaction to the carpetbag regime, remains in effect today, though it has
been significantly amended over the years.83
Each of the constitutions guaranteed the right to trial by jury, using
similar but not identical language. The pertinent provisions are as follows:
1836: "[T]he right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate." 84
1861: "[T]he right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate to free
white men and Indians."
' 85
1864: "[T]he right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate." 86
1868: "[T]he right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate and shall
extend to all cases at law without regard to the amount in con-
troversy; but a jury may be waived by the parties in all cases
in the manner prescribed by law."
87
544 (McLean, J., dissenting). Justice Curtis's dissent also took the position that the positive
limitations expressed in the Constitution applied to the territories. Id. at 614 (Curtis, J., dis-
senting).
As the end of the nineteenth century approached, the Court observed that whether "the
provisions of the Constitution... relating to the right of trial by jury in suits at common law
apply to the Territories of the United States is no longer an open question." Thompson v.
Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 346 (1898), overruled on other grounds by Collins v. Youngblood, 497
U.S. 37 (1990); see also Rassmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516, 527 (1905) (stating
Constitution is "self-operative" in its application to territories of the United States); Black v.
Jackson, 177 U.S. 349, 363 (1900) (finding Seventh Amendment "applies to judicial pro-
ceedings in the Territories of the United States"); Springville City v. Thomas, 166 U.S. 707,
708-09 (1897) (Seventh Amendment "secured unanimity finding a verdict as an essential
feature of trial by jury in common-law cases" and Congress cannot give a territory "the
power to change the constitutional rule"); Kennon v. Gilmer, 131 U.S. 22, 29 (1889) (hold-
ing that Seventh Amendment "is in full force in Montana, as in all other organized territories
of the United States); Power v. Williams, 205 N.W. 9, 12 (N.D. 1925) ("[T]he constitutional
right of trial by jury in civil cases was secured by the Seventh Amendment... against en-
croachment in the territory of Dakota.").
82. Each is reproduced in the "constitutions" volume of the Arkansas Code Annotated.
83. KAY COLLETT Goss, THE ARKANSAS STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 1-9
(1993); Robert A. Leflar, Constitutional Revision in Arkansas, 24 ARK. L. REv. 155, 155-59
(1970).
84. ARK. CONST. of 1836 art. II, § 6.
85. ARK. CONST. of 1861 art. II, § 6.
86. ARK. CONST. of 1864 art. II, § 6.
87. ARK. CONST. of 1868 art. I, § 6.
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1874: "The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, and shall ex-
tend to all cases at law, without regard to the amount in con-
troversy; but a jury trial may be waived by the parties in all
cases in the manner prescribed by law."
8 8
In addition, the 1868 constitution provided that
[n]o right of way shall be appropriated to the use of any corporation un-
til full compensation therefor shall be first made in money, or first se-
cured by a deposit of money, to the owner, irrespective of any benefit
from any improvement proposed by such corporation; which compensa-
tion shall be ascertained by a jury of twelve men in a court of record, as
shall be prescribed by law.
89
Almost identical language appears in the present constitution.90 The
purpose of these provisions was "to enlarge the rights of the citizens by ex-
tending the right of trial by jury to a class of cases wherein it did not before
exist."91
For more than 140 years, civil procedure in Arkansas was governed by
statute. In its initial session after statehood, the General Assembly in 1837
required a jury trial as to "[a]ll issues of fact joined in any suit at law,"
unless "neither party shall demand a trial by jury" or the parties had agreed
"to refer the matter in dispute to arbitrators." 92 The Civil Code of 1869,
88. ARK. CONST. of 1874 art. II, § 7. This section was amended in 1928 by adding a
new clause providing that
in all jury trials in civil cases, where as many as nine of the jurors agree upon a
verdict, the verdict so agreed upon shall be returned as the verdict of such jury,
provided, however, that where a verdict is returned by less than twelve jurors all
the jurors consenting to such verdict shall sign the same.
Id.; see Publisher's Notes, ARK. CONST. amend. 16; S.J. Res. 4, 46th General Assemb. (Ark.
1927) (resolution directing that amendment be placed before the voters). The amendment
came after the supreme court struck down a statute that had allowed a verdict based on the
concurrence of nine of the twelve jurors. Minnequa Cooperage Co. v. Hendricks, 130 Ark.
264, 268-69, 197 S.W. 280, 281-82 (1917).
89. ARK. CONST. of 1868 art. V, § 48.
90. ARK. CONST. of 1874 art. XII, § 9.
91. Exparte Reynolds, 52 Ark. 330, 335, 12 S.W. 570, 571 (1889) (quoting Reckner v.
Warner, 22 Ohio St. 275, 291 (1872)). However, the court held in Reynolds that the right to a
jury trial extends only to the final assessment of the amount of compensation, and that the
legislature may prescribe a different method for ascertaining the amount to be deposited as
security. Id. at 335-39, 12 S.W. at 571-73. In addition, this specific jury trial guarantee ap-
plies only to condemnation actions by private corporations and not, for example, to such
actions by levee districts. Young v. Red Fork Levee Dist., 124 Ark. 61, 69, 186 S.W. 604,
607 (1916).
92. ARK. REv. STAT. ch. 116, § 98 (1837). Several other statutes provided for trial by
jury in particular situations. E.g., id. at ch. 4, § 101 (demand for allowance against estate
exceeding twenty dollars); id. at ch. 13, §§ 32-33 (attachment); id. at ch. 63, §§ 9, 18 (forci-
ble entry and detainer); id. at ch. 78, §§ 2, 4 (insanity); id. at ch. 92, § 4 (mandamus); id. at
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which modernized civil procedure in the state, also provided for trial by
jury: "[i]ssues of fact, arising in actions by proceedings at law for the recov-
ery of money, or of specific, real or personal property, shall be tried by a
jury, unless a jury trial is waived. 93
The Civil Code did not merge law and equity,94 which had been di-
vided since the territorial period. From 1819 to 1836, the Arkansas Territory
had a single trial court, but it had separate law and equity "sides." 95 This
model was continued after statehood under the 1836 constitution, but that
document also provided that the General Assembly "when they deem. it ex-
pedient may establish separate Courts of Chancery." 96 The legislature did
not exercise this authority until 1855, when it created a chancery court for
Pulaski County.97 Similar language authorizing but not requiring separate
chancery courts appeared in the 1861 and 1864 constitutions,98 as well as in
ch. 107, § 15 (partition); id. at ch. 126, §§ 14-18, 37-39 (replevin); id. at ch. 157, §§ 32-33
(validity of will).
93. ARKANSAS CODE OF PRACTICE IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES, tit. 9, ch. 2, art. 1,
§ 337 (1869) [hereinafter CIVIL CODE]. All other issues of fact, "whether arising in proceed-
ings at law, or equitable proceedings," were tried to the court, "subject to its power to order
any issue or issues to be tried by jury." Id. § 338. The right to a jury could be waived by
consent or by failing to appear at trial. Id. at art. 3, § 363. Also, by submitting to trial of all
issues by a court of equity and not seeking a transfer to law, a litigant waived his right to a
jury trial. Mcllvenny v. Horton, 227 Ark. 826, 828, 302 S.W.2d 70, 71 (1957); Love v. Bry-
son, 57 Ark. 589, 594, 22 S.W. 341, 342 (1893).
94. The code's drafters looked not to the pathbreaking Field Code of New York as a
model, but rather to the Kentucky Code, which had retained the division between law and
equity. T.D. CRAWFORD, ANNOTATED CIVIL CODE OF ARKANSAS V (1934); HEPBURN, supra
note 57, § 114; see also W. Surety Co. v. Gates, 254 Ark. 478, 482, 494 S.W.2d 479, 482
(1973) (Fogleman, J., concurring) (Civil Code of 1869 "was an adoption of the Kentucky
Code"); Holliday Bros. v. Cohen, 34 Ark. 707, 716 (1879) (sections of Civil Code dealing
with attachment "are parts of the Kentucky system, and were brought over, verbatim");
Young v. King, 33 Ark. 745, 746 (1878) ("Such also appears to be the practice under the
Kentucky Code, from which ours was copied."). Professor Gitelman, noting that there was
no stated explanation for choosing the Kentucky Code as a model, has suggested that the
thirteen-year existence of the Pulaski County chancery court influenced the decision: "[I]f
Arkansas had adopted the New York model entirely, an existing institution would have been
closed down completely." Gitelman, supra note 25, at 240.
95. Gitelman, supra note 25, at 235-36; Edwin H. Greenebaum, Arkansas' Judiciary: Its
History and Structure, 18 ARK. L. REV. .152, 155 (1964); see, e.g., Drope v. Miller, 7 F. Cas.
1108 (Ark. Terr. 1827) (No. 4,092a). By statute, the court was to exercise chancery jurisdic-
tion "[iun all cases where a remedy cannot be had in the ordinary course of the common law
proceeding." STEELE & M'CAMPBELL, supra note 77, at 108.
96. ARK. CONST. of 1836 art. VI, § I.
97. ARK. REV. STAT. ch. 28, § 1 (1857) (approved Jan. 15, 1855). As Professor Gitel-
man has noted, the General Assembly's action was politically motivated, the result of a
standoff between the state and the trustees of the Real Estate Bank of Arkansas. An action to
create a receivership for the public bank, which was insolvent, was the first order of business
for the new chancery court. Gitelman, supra note 25, at 237-38.
98. ARK. CONST. of 1861 art. VI, § 1; ARK. CONST. of 1864 art. VII, § 1.
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the 1874 version.99 The constitution of 1868 did not expressly mention
chancery courts but vested the state's judicial power in "the Senate sitting as
a court of impeachment, a Supreme Court, Circuit Courts, and such other
courts inferior to the Supreme Court as the General Assembly may from
time to time establish."'
Pulaski County had the state's only chancery court for thirty years, and
during that time the circuit courts in other counties had separate law and
equity sides.' 0 ' In 1885, the legislature created the First Chancery District
for Pulaski, Faulkner, and Lonoke counties. 10 2 By 1901, there were six such
districts, 10 3 and in 1903 the General Assembly established chancery districts
throughout the state.'°4 Thus,
when England and a majority of the American states had abolished sepa-
rate chancery courts and had either completely merged law and equity
under the New York model or had single courts with a law side and an
equity side as under the federal model, Arkansas entered the twentieth
century carrying the full weight of the anomaly of separate courts of eq-
uity.
105
The Civil Code, as amended from time to time, "served as the basic
Arkansas procedure law until 1979,"106 when Arkansas Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure went into effect. These rules were based on the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, with modifications to accommodate the dual system. The
starkest example was Rule 2. The corresponding federal rule effectuated the
merger of law and equity by providing that "[t]here shall be one form of
action to be known as 'civil action. ' ,"10 7 In the Arkansas version, however,
this sentence was followed by another: "Actions in equity shall be brought
in the Chancery Court and actions at law shall be brought in the Circuit
99. ARK. CONST. of 1874 art. VII, § 1, repealed by ARK. CONST. amend. 80.
100. ARK. CONST. of 1868 art. VII, § 1.
101. See Morgan Util., Inc. v. Perry County, 183 Ark. 542, 547, 37 S.W.2d 74, 77 (1931)
(the circuit court "was a court of dual jurisdiction, the judge presiding in one division or 'on
the law side' as a judge of a superior court of common law, and also sitting in chancery as
judge of a court of equity").
102. 1885 Ark. Acts 171.
103. Gitelman, supra note 25, at 240 n.68.
104. 1903 Ark. Acts 166 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-13-301 (LEXIS Repl. 1999),
superseded by ARK. CONST. amend. 80, § 6(A)). Votes on the bill were close in both
houses-it passed 17-14 in the Senate, with four senators not voting, and 46-43 in the House,
with eleven representatives not voting. Gitelman, supra note 25, at 243 n.70.
105. Gitelman, supra note 25, at 244.
106. DAVID NEWBERN, ARKANSAS CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1-1 (2d ed. 1993).
107. FED. R. Civ. P. 2.
2002]
UALR LAW REVIEW
Court." 10 8 The supreme court deleted the latter in 2001 following the adop-
tion of Amendment 80.109
With respect to trial by jury, the rules say relatively little. Under Rule
38, "[a]ny party may demand a trial by jury of any issue triable of right by a
jury by filing with the clerk a demand therefor.""10 This provision simply
"recognizes the constitutional right to trial by jury""' and does not purport
to define the dimensions of that right. Rule 38 also states that "[t]he failure
of a party to file a demand as required by this rule ... constitutes a waiver
by him of trial by jury.' E12 The supreme court has upheld this provision as
consistent with Article II, Section 7.113 Under Rule 39, "[i]ssues not de-
manded for trial by jury... shall be tried by the court," although the judge
may, in his or her discretion, upon motion, order a jury trial "in an action in
which such a demand might have been made of right."' "4 Where there is no
right to a jury trial, Rule 39 allows the court "upon motion or of its own
initiative, [to] try any issue with an advisory jury or, with the consent of all
parties, [to] order a trial with a jury whose verdict has the same effect as if
trial by jury had been a matter of right."'" 5
108. ARK. R. Civ. P. 2.
109. In re Implementation of Amendment 80: Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure
& Inferior Court Rules, 345 Ark. Adv. app. (May 24, 2001) (per curiam).
110. ARK. R. Crw. P. 38(a).
111. Reporter's Notes, ARK. R. Civ. P. 38. Under the corresponding federal rule, "[t]he
right of trial by jury as declared by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution or as given
by a statute of the United States shall be preserved to the parties inviolate." FED. R. Civ. P.
38(a).
112. ARK. R. Civ. P. 38(c). The demand must be made "in writing at any time after the
commencement of the action and not later than 20 days prior to the trial date." Id. at R. 38(a).
113. Venable v. Becker, 287 Ark. 236, 238,697 S.W.2d 903, 904 (1985) (the constitution
states that "a jury trial may be waived by the parties in all cases in the manner prescribed by
law," and "Rule 38 is the law").
114. ARK. R. Civ. P. 39(b); see Duncan v. McGaugh, 19 Ark. App. 276, 279, 719 S.W.2d
710, 712 (1986) (holding that circuit court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant
appellants request for trial by jury).
115. ARK. R. Civ. P. 39(c). Prior to adoption of the Rules of Civil Procedure, "jury ver-
dicts in chancery court [were] considered as advisory only and not binding upon the court."
Reporter's Notes, ARK. R. Civ. P. 39 (citing City of Magnolia v. Davies, 188 Ark. 19, 64
S.W.2d 85 (1933); Sullivan v. Wilson Mercantile Co., 172 Ark. 914, 290 S.W. 938 (1927));
see also Evans v. Weise, 234 Ark. 137, 140, 350 S.W.2d 616, 618 (1961); Hinkle v. Hinkle,
55 Ark. 583, 587, 18 S.W. 1049, 1049 (1892). Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 39(c),
which tracks its federal counterpart, changed this practice in one respect: the verdict of an
advisory jury is binding if all parties consent. With such consent, "it is possible to have a
binding jury verdict in equity proceedings." Reporter's Notes, ARK. R. Civ. P. 39. Absent the
consent of all parties, however, the jury's verdict is simply advisory. As a federal court has
observed with respect to the latter situation, an advisory jury "does no more than advise the
judge; the ultimate responsibility for finding the facts remains with the court." Frostie Co. v.
Dr. Pepper Co., 361 F.2d 124, 126 (5th Cir. 1966) (emphasis in original). Federal cases also
hold that the trial judge's decision to impanel an advisory jury is wholly discretionary, and
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III. MODE OF TRIAL PRIOR TO MERGER
A variety of scenarios could arise under the pre-merger practice. For
example, the plaintiff often needed both legal and equitable remedies in
order to obtain complete relief. Sometimes he or she could choose among
remedies. In other situations the plaintiff might assert an action at law, only
to face a suit by the defendant in chancery to enjoin the legal proceeding. As
Professor Fleming James pointed out, "[t]he differences among these [sce-
narios] were important because different patterns of trial and trial sequence
were applied."' 16 The patterns identified by Professor James have implica-
tions for the right to a jury trial under the merged system and therefore are
discussed here.
A. Plaintiff Injects Both Legal and Equitable Claims
1. Plaintiff Had to Resort to Equity First to Get Any Relief or to Ob-
tain Full Relief
Here the equitable issue would be tried first. Under the cleanup doc-
trine, the chancery court would award legal relief as well, at least if the
plaintiff so requested. To take Professor James's example, suppose that A
and B were parties to a contract which, as written, did not support a right
claimed by A. However, A wished to argue that because of mutual mistake,
the contract did not embody the actual agreement of the parties. The com-
mon law would not remedy this type of mistake; consequently, A would be
forced to seek reformation of the contract in equity. If the chancellor found
mutual mistake, he would not only reform the agreement, but also determine
A's rights thereunder and, if appropriate, award legal relief. In the event that
A also had rights under the contract as written, he or she would assert the
legal claim in equity along with the suit for reformation. If A brought the
legal claim separately at law, the chancellor would enjoin prosecution of
that action until the question of mutual mistake was determined." 17
the exercise of that discretion is not reviewable by an appellate court. See, e.g., Cox v. Bab-
cock & Wilcox Co., 471 F.2d 13, 14 (4th Cir. 1972).
116. Fleming James, Jr., Right to a Jury Trial in Civil Actions, 72 YALE L.J. 655, 670
(1963).
117. Id. at 670-71. A temporary injunction would also issue if B had sued A at law under
the terms of the contract. Id. at 670.
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2. Equitable Relief Was Necessary for Plaintiff's Complete Protec-
tion, but Equity Refused to Give Such Relief Unless and Until a
Preliminary Legal Issue Had Been Determined at Law by a Jury
In this situation, there would be two trials: one to a jury and the other,
if plaintiff was successful in the first, to the chancellor on the issues that
pertained to the propriety of equitable relief. Professor James offered the
following illustrations:
Where A claimed that B's structure encroached on A's land but B also
claimed title to the land under the structure, equity would not order the
structure removed until the title dispute was settled at law. If A won the
law action, equity would order B to remove the structure if it was im-
practical for the sheriff to remove it under a writ of execution. Again,
where A claimed that B owed him a legal debt and wished to reach B's
equitable assets, or property conveyed by B to C to defraud B's credi-
tors, equity would grant no relief if B disputed the debt until A had re-
duced his debt claim to a judgment at law. Then, at least if execution
could not be satisfied, equitable relief would be forthcoming on a proper
showing. 118
Between these extremes was "a host of others in many of which either
kind of relief depended on the resolution of an issue which either tribunal
would try." ' 1 9 Professor James considered these cases as "too hetrogeneous
[sic] to be called a pattern,"' 120 but discussing two of them is helpful for pur-
poses of this article.
3. Plaintiff Could Proceed in Either Law or Equity and Thus Choose
the Mode of Trial
Suppose, for example, that A wished to sue B for copyright infringe-
ment and that the applicable statute entitled the plaintiff to an injunction,
compensatory damages, and punitive damages. A could sue B in equity for
injunctive relief and, invoking the cleanup doctrine, for compensatory dam-
ages. The chancellor would make the key factual determination, i.e.,
whether B had violated the statute. Alternatively, A could sue B in a court
of law for compensatory and punitive damages, with a jury deciding
whether there had been a violation. Either way, a second suit would be nec-
essary if A wanted complete relief, equity refused to enforce a penalty and
would thus not award punitive damages, and law could not grant an injunc-
tion. Because determination of the common factual issue in the first action
118. Id. at671.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 675.
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would bind the parties in the second, A could choose the factfinder by
choosing the initial forum. If punitive damages were not available under the
statute, A could obtain complete relief in chancery by virtue of the cleanup
doctrine. However, the plaintiff in this situation also had the option of seek-
ing damages at law and an injunction in equity, with the order of suit deter-
mining who would decide the common issue of fact.'
21
4. Plaintiff Was Required to Choose Between Legal and Equitable
Remedies, and That Choice Would Determine the Forum and
Thus the Mode of Trial
If, for instance, B breached an agreement with A by refusing to convey
certain land, then A would be entitled to either specific performance of the
contract or damages for its breach, but not both. A's election of the remedy
would place the action in one court or the other and govern the mode of trial
on issues that would be presented in a claim for either type of relief, such as
the making of the contract, performance of conditions precedent, and
breach. 1
22
B. Equitable Defense Is Raised to Legal Claim
Certain defenses, equitable in nature, could not be successfully asserted
to defeat a legal claim because they were not recognized at law. As a result,
the defendant in an action at law would be forced to raise the issue in eq-
uity. By way of illustration, assume that A sued B at law on a specialty con-
tract. B, as obligor, claimed that he was induced by fraud to execute it in
favor of A. However, B could not assert this defense in a law court; rather,
he would be required to go into equity and seek cancellation of the contract.
The chancellor would temporarily enjoin the legal action pending resolution
of the fraud question. 
23
If he found no fraud, the chancellor would dismiss the suit, dissolve the
injunction, and leave the matter in the hands of the law court. If he found
fraud, however, the chancellor would issue a decree canceling the contract
and making the injunction permanent. Where there were residual legal is-
121. Id. at 671-72.
122. James, supra note 116, at 672. If A initially chose equitable relief, the chancellor
might conclude that specific performance was impossible or unsuitable. Dismissal of the suit
for want of equity jurisdiction usually followed, with A free to pursue his remedies in a court
of law. In rare cases, however, the chancellor retained jurisdiction, decided the merits, and
awarded damages. See, e.g., Denton v. Stewart, 29 Eng. Rep. 1156 (Ch. 1786). Professor
James noted that in eighteenth century England this "substituted legal relief' was apparently
confined to "the case of impossibility arising after suit" but has "enjoyed considerable
growth since then." James, supra note 116, at 673.
123. James, supra note 116, at 679.
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sues, as would be the case when the instrument was reformed rather than
canceled, the chancellor would dispose of them under the cleanup doctrine
as incidental to the equitable relief.'
24
Several other defenses developed in equity, including mistake, estop-
pel, setoff, unclean hands, undue hardship, and part performance sufficient
to take a contract out of the Statute of Frauds. 25 As Professor James pointed
out, however, "[m]any matters which were cognizable only in equity in re-
mote times came to be recognized as defenses by courts of law-worked
into law as we say-in the course of time."'126
C. Equitable Claim, Legal Counterclaim
If A's equitable claim against B did not overlap factually with B's legal
claim against A, then each would be litigated separately in different
courts-unless B sought to use his claim for damages as a setoff against A's
claim. 127 The matter became more complicated when the claims of A and B
had common factual issues. Professor James describes two situations that
fell into this category.
1. Plaintiff Sought Substantial Equitable Relief, i.e., Foreclosure of a
Mortgage, Specific Performance of a Contract
If the defendant had a legal claim against the plaintiff arising from the
same operative facts as the plaintiff's claim, the defendant had a choice
whether to assert that claim in the equity suit or bring it in a separate action
at law. For example, suppose that A, a contractor, brought suit in equity to
foreclose a mechanics' lien for the amount he claimed due for the installa-
tion of a furnace in B's building. However, B considered the installation
defective and contemplated an action against A for breach of contract. B
could assert that cause of action as a counterclaim in the chancery suit, in
which case the issues concerning A's performance would be tried to the
court. Alternatively, B could fail to controvert A's performance in chancery
and then sue A at law for damages, thereby obtaining a jury trial. Although
B's chancery pleading in which there was no denial of A's performance
would be admissible against B as an admission, B would be free to explain
to the jury why he had not controverted performance in the prior action.
124. Id.
125. See John L. Garvey, Some Aspects of the Merger of Law and Equity, 10 CATH. U. L.
REv. 59, 66-68 (1961); Douglas Laycock, The Triumph of Equity, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Summer 1993, at 53, 70; Spencer R. Liverant & Walter H. Hitchler, A History of Equity in
Pennsylvania, 37 DICK. L. REv. 156, 167-71 (1933).
126. James, supra note 116, at 679.
127. Id. at 681 &n.159.
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Moreover, neither claim nor issue preclusion would prevent B from litigat-
ing the performance issue at law.
128
2. Plaintiff Sought Equitable Relief Principally to Defeat a Contem-
plated Legal Action by Defendant
In this situation, the chancery court would sometimes, but not always,
enjoin the defendant from subsequently bringing the legal action. Although
this relief was coercive in form, it was in effect a declaration of the rights of
the parties that would dispose of a potential legal claim against the equity
plaintiff on grounds that he or she could have been defensively in the action
at law. Whether to grant such relief was largely discretionary with the chan-
cellor and depended on the circumstances. If the injunction were granted,
issues that would have otherwise been litigated at law by a jury would be
decided by the chancellor, much as if the legal action had been asserted as a
counterclaim in equity.
By way of illustration, consider the facts of American Life Insurance
Co. v. Stewart,'29 decided by the Supreme Court shortly before the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure took effect. There a life insurance policy would
have become incontestable by its terms "two years from its date of issue,"
except for nonpayment of premiums. The insured died, and the beneficiary
had the luxury of postponing an action on the policy until after the contesta-
bility period had expired. The insurance company, claiming fraud by the
insured in the application for the policy, brought suit to cancel the policy
before it became incontestable. The beneficiary moved to dismiss for want
of equity and, shortly thereafter, began an action at law to recover on the
policy. The insurance company responded by asking the court to enjoin
prosecution of the pending legal action.
In situations such as this, the chancellor could either retain the case on
the docket until the insurer's fraud defense was actually tried by the jury in
the law action or enjoin prosecution of the law action and try the fraud issue
itself.130 In American Life, the trial judge chose the latter course of action
and ruled in favor of the insurance company, but the court of appeals re-
versed. The Supreme Court upheld the trial judge, rejecting the benefici-
ary's argument that equity lost jurisdiction when a legal remedy later be-
came available to the insurance company, i.e., a defense of fraud in the ac-
tion on the policy.13' In such instances the equity court could, in its discre-
128. Id. at 681-83.
129. 300 U.S. 203 (1937).
130. James, supra note 116, at 683.
131. 300 U.S. at 215-16.
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tion, enjoin the later action at law "in order to allow the whole dispute to be
determined in one case in one court."'
' 32
D. Declaratory Relief
As suggested in the preceding category, equity would on occasion
grant relief that had the effect of a binding declaration of the rights of the
parties. In many situations, however, equity would not grant such relief, as
when the putative defendant in an action for breach of contract or personal
injuries sought a determination in chancery of an issue that was available as
a defense at law. This remedy-interposing the defense in the legal action-
was considered adequate. 33 Modem statutes made declaratory relief avail-
able in all types of situations, including those in which equity would not
entertain a suit to establish nonliability1
34
E. Procedural Device Available Only in Equity
Professor James did not discuss this scenario, perhaps because he be-
lieved it to be covered by the cleanup doctrine. The shareholders' derivative
suit is a good illustration. At common law, a corporation had a legal right to
sue its directors for misuse of corporate assets or usurpation of corporate
opportunities. But the corporation, being under the directors' control, would
not do so. Disgruntled shareholders turned to the chancery courts, which
gave them standing to sue on behalf of the corporation if they could estab-
lish certain preliminary facts, i.e., that they had demanded that the corpora-
tion vindicate its own rights. Then, having taken the case to create such
standing for the shareholders, the court would proceed, without a jury, to
adjudicate the merits, even if the only relief sought was legal in nature.' 35
The shareholders' derivative suit is a specialized type of representative
or class suit, "an invention of equity to enable it to proceed to a decree in
suits where the number of those interested in the subject of the litigation is
so great that their joinder as parties ... is impracticable."'' 36 Another effort
132. Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 505 (1959).
133. James, supra note 116, at 685.
134. The Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act, approved in 1922 by the National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, was adopted by most states. For the Arkan-
sas version, see ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-111-101 to -11 1 (Michie 1987) (enacted in 1953).
Congress passed the federal declaratory judgment act in 1934. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202
(1994).
135. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949); Dodge v.
Woolsey, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 331, 341 (1855).
136. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 41 (1940). The class action grew out of the "bill of
peace," which allowed the chancery court to hear an action by or against representatives of a
group if the plaintiff could establish that the number of persons involved was so large as to
672 [Vol. 24
RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL AFTER MERGER
of equity to settle in one case all aspects of a single controversy was inter-
pleader, which enables a person facing inconsistent claims to the same
property or obligation (the "stakeholder") to bring the adverse claimants
into a single action in which the rights of all parties are determined.137 Be-
cause a class suit and bill of interpleader could be brought only in equity,
there was no jury determination of issues which, under other circumstances,
would have been heard by a jury at law.' 38
IV. THE FEDERAL EXPERIENCE AFTER MERGER
Since the merger of law and equity in 1938, the Supreme Court has
struggled "to develop an interpretation of the Seventh Amendment that is
both consistent with its historical basis, and capable of integrating modem
procedural developments."' 39 The Court's approach has been described as
"dynamic,"' 40 which is to say that it does not inflexibly follow history. As a
result, the Court has held that there is a right to a jury trial in cases present-
ing both legal and equitable issues that would have been tried without a jury
on the equity "side" of the federal district prior to merger.
A. Pre-Merger Case Law
The first clause of the Seventh Amendment provides that the right to
trial by jury "shall be preserved" in "suits at common law.' 4' The word
"preserved" suggests that the right to a jury trial is frozen in time as of
1791, when the Seventh Amendment was ratified. The Supreme Court ini-
tially agreed with this static view: "In order to ascertain the scope and
meaning of the Seventh Amendment," the Court said in a 1935 case, "resort
make joinder impossible or impracticable, that all members of the group possessed a joint
interest in the matter to be adjudicated, and that the named parties adequately represented
those absent from the action. See Adair v. New River Co., 32 Eng. Rep. 1153 (Ch. 1805). See
generally Raymond B. Marcin, Searching for the Origin of the Class Action, 23 CATH. U. L.
REV. 515 (1974); Stephen C. Yeazell, Group Litigation and Social Context: Toward a His-
tory of the Class Action, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 866 (1977).
137. Interpleader was available in narrow circumstances under the ancient common law,
but the device became obsolete and was taken over by the courts of equity. See generally
Ralph V. Rogers, Historical Origins of Interpleader, 51 YALE L.J. 924 (1942). Until the
middle of the eighteenth century, the chancellor would send contested issues of fact to the
law courts for jury trial. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & Myron Moskovitz, An Historical and
Critical Analysis ofInterpleader, 52 CAL. L. REV. 706, 716 n.38 (1964).
138. See, e.g., Liberty Oil Co. v. Condon Nat'l Bank, 260 U.S. 235, 244 (1922) (inter-
pleader); Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 288, 302-03 (1853) (class suit).
139. JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 11.5 (3d ed. 1999).
140. Id.
141. U.S. CONST. amend. VII, cl. 2 (also limiting the right to cases "where the value in
controversy shall exceed twenty dollars").
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must be had to the appropriate rules of the common law established at the
time of the adoption of that constitutional provision in 1791.,,I42
But how does one determine "the appropriate rules" of the common
law? One possibility would be to examine the practice of the states in 1791.
That is, a case in federal court would be tried by jury if, in the state where
the court sat, that mode of trial was employed in similar cases. The obvious
problem with this approach is that a constitutional right would be tied to
"the widely divergent definitions among the states as to what was a suit at
common law.' ' 143 As Alexander Hamilton argued, it would be "capricious"
to base the federal right to a jury trial "on the accidental situation of the
court and parties."'4
Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court took a different tack. Justice
Story, in an 1812 opinion on circuit, asserted that "[b]eyond all question, the
common law here alluded to is not the common law of any individual state
... , but it is the common law of England, the grand reservoir of all our ju-
risprudence."'145 Because this conclusion was "obvious to every person ac-
quainted with the history of the law," Story said that there was no need for
him to "expound the grounds" for it. 146 Such an exposition would have been
difficult, for there is nothing in the legislative history of the Seventh
,Amendment or in other sources suggesting that the phrase "common law"
was intended to refer to the common law of England.
147
Nonetheless, the Court subsequently adopted Justice Story's approach
in cases which, like the one before him, involved the Seventh Amendment's
re-examination clause and its phrase "according to the rules of the common
142. Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 476 (1935); see also NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 48 (1937); Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S.
654, 657 (1935); Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 288 (1930); Liberty Oil, 260 U.S. at
243; Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 350 (1898), overruled on other grounds by Collins v.
Youndblood, 497 U.S. 37 (1990).
143. Klein, supra note 37, at 1018.
144. THE FEDERALIST No. 83, supra note 50, at 567-68. Hamilton's comment came in
response to Anti-Federalist proposals, during the ratification period, for jury trials "as hereto-
fore" or in "actions at common law." Hamilton assumed that these proposals would link the
federal guarantee to the varying practices among the states; that is, "causes in the federal
courts should be tried by jury, if in the state where the courts sat, that mode of trial would
obtain in a similar case in the state courts." Id. at 567. Among his concerns was that in states
where the line between law and equity was "less precise" than in England, the federal courts
would be required to employ juries in traditionally equitable cases. Id. at 571. Hamilton
considered equity cases inappropriate for trial by jury because of the chancellor's discretion
to deal with "extraordinary" cases and because the "intricate" matters heard in equity often
required "long, deliberate and critical investigation as would be impracticable to men called
from their occupations" to serve as jurors. Id. at 569.
145. United States v. Wonson, 28 F. Cas. 745, 750 (C.C.D. Mass 1812) (No. 16,750).
146. Id.
147. Klein, supra note 37, at 1022.
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law."' 4 8 The Court also looked to the English practice in construing the term
"suits at common law" in the amendment's first clause. In Liberty Oil Co. v.
Condon National Bank,149 for example, Chief Justice Taft wrote that the
Seventh Amendment must be construed in light of "the practice in the
courts of law and chancery in England when our Constitution and the Sev-
enth Amendment were adopted."'
50
The plaintiff in that case, Liberty Oil Co., brought an action at law
against the defendant bank to recover funds deposited there in connection
with the plaintiffs purchase of certain real property. The bank disclaimed
any interest in the funds and asked the district court to direct that the sellers,
as the other potential claimants to the money, be made parties. The court
entered an order of interpleader, thereby granting defendant's request for
relief historically equitable in nature. Consequently, the Chief Justice held,
the district judge should have transferred the case to the court's equity side,
where the equitable issue would be tried first to the court and any remaining
legal issues then tried to a jury. That being so, "[t]he right of trial by jury is
preserved exactly as it was at common law.., under the system of separate
courts.'
15 1
Long before Liberty Oil, the Court made plain that the term "common
law" is used in the Seventh Amendment "in contradistinction to equity, and
admiralty, and maritime jurisprudence." 152 Thus, if a case would have been
heard in the English chancery courts in 1791, there was no right to a jury
trial under the Seventh Amendment. 153 This rigid historical approach also
extended to cases arising under statutes. For example, NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp. 54 stemmed from an administrative proceeding initi-
148. See, e.g., Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 (1935);
Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 476 (1935); Slocum v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 228 U.S. 364,
378-79 (1913); Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 13 (1899).
149. 260 U.S. 235 (1922).
150. Id. at 244. More recently, however, the Court has suggested that something more
than the English practice may be relevant: "Our formulations of the historical test do not deal
with the possibility of conflict between actual English common-law practice and American
assumptions about what that practice was, or between English and American practices at the
relevant time. No such complications arise in this case." Markham v. Westview Instruments,
Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 376 n.3 (1996).
151. Liberty Oil, 260 U.S. at 243. The precise issue before the Supreme Court was
whether appellate review was by writ of error or by appeal. Id. at 240 (holding that the case
was equitable and proper review was by appeal).
152. Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 446 (1830).
153. See, e.g., Pease v. Rathbun-Jones Eng'g Co., 243 U.S. 273, 278-79 (1917) (Seventh
Amendment does not require jury trial when a court of equity disposes of incidental legal
issues that would otherwise been heard in an action at law); cf. Bank of Hamilton v. Dudley's
Lessee, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 492, 524 (1829) (claim for cost of improvements to leased premises
is a suit at common law and must be tried by jury).
154. 301 U.S. 1(1937).
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ated by a labor union pursuant to the National Labor Relations Act of 1935.
The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) found that Jones & Laughlin
had violated the act by engaging in unfair labor practices by discriminating
against members of the union, discharging workers because of their union
membership, and coercing and intimidating its employees in an effort to
interfere with their self-organization. The board found in favor of the union
and ordered the company to cease and desist from these activities and to
reinstate certain employees with back pay. When Jones & Laughlin failed to
comply with this order, the NLRB petitioned for enforcement in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The court denied the petition,
but the Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed.
The company, in resisting enforcement of the order, argued that its
Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury had been violated because the
board's back pay order was the equivalent of a money judgment. The Court
rejected this contention in two paragraphs at the end of a lengthy opinion by
Chief Justice Hughes. The Seventh Amendment does not apply where the
proceeding is not in the nature of a suit at common law, and the case at bar
as "a statutory proceeding" and "unknown to the common law."' 55
B. The Modem Cases
Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides in part that
"[t]he right of trial by jury as declared by the Seventh Amendment... shall
be preserved to the parties inviolate"' 56 and thus "does not undertake to de-
fine the cases in which there is a right to jury trial."' 57 Although this provi-
sion neither diminished nor enlarged the right to trial by jury, 5 8 the merger
of law and equity in the federal courts 59 has in effect expanded that right in
cases with legal and equitable elements.
155. Id. at 48. The Court also rejected the company's jury trial argument on the separate
ground that the Seventh Amendment is inapplicable when "recovery of money damages is an
incident to [nonlegal] relief even though damages might have been recovered in an action at
law." Id. at 48. (citing Pease, 243 U.S. at 279 ("A court of equity, having jurisdiction of the
principal case, will completely dispose of its incidents and put an end to further litigation.");
Clark v. Wooster, 119 U.S. 322, 325 (1886) ("[T]he mere fact that the ground for [equitable]
relief expired.., would not take away the jurisdiction, and preclude the court from proceed-
ing to grant the incidental relief which belongs to cases of that sort.")). In Jones & Laughlin,
the NLRB's order reinstating dismissed employees was analogous to injunctive relief, and
the award of back pay was incidental to that relief and thus within the cleanup doctrine.
156. FED. R. Civ. P. 38(a).
157. 9 WRIGHT& MILLER, supra note 31, § 2301.
158. Id. (citing Rachal v. Ingram Corp., 795 F.2d 1210 (5th Cir. 1986); Institutional Drug
Distrib., Inc. v. Yankwich, 249 F.2d 566 (9th Cir. 1957)); see also James, supra note 116, at
667 (drafters of federal rules, like those of the civil codes, "took a neutralist position with
respect to jury trial").
159. See FED. R. Civ. P. 2 ("There shall be one form of action to be known as 'civil
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These "mixed" cases arise in several situations, largely on account of
the liberal joinder provisions of the Federal Rules, which allow legal and
equitable claims to be brought and resolved in one action. 160 Prior to
merger, these actions would have been heard in a court of equity under the
cleanup doctrine, but the Supreme Court has not considered itself bound
rigidly by history. Its leading decisions are, in chronological order, Beacon
Theatres, Inc. v. Westover,161 Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 162 and Ross v.
Bernhard.63 Following a discussion of these cases is a brief examination of
other Supreme Court rulings.
1. Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover
Fox West Coast Theatres Corp., the owner of movie theatres in Cali-
fornia, had entered into contracts with various motion picture distributors
giving it exclusive rights to show first-run films in the "San Bernadino
competitive area." The agreements also provided for "clearance," i.e., a
period of time during which no other theatre operator could exhibit the same
movies. Fox sued Beacon Theatres, which had built a drive-in theatre eleven
miles away, for a declaratory judgment that the exclusivity agreements did
not violate the federal antitrust laws. Fox also asked for an injunction to
prevent Beacon from instituting a threatened antitrust suit on the basis of the
agreements until the claim for declaratory relief was decided. Beacon
counterclaimed, asserting the antitrust action that Fox wanted to enjoin, and
demanded a jury trial. The district court granted Fox's motion to strike the
demand, viewing the complaint as essentially equitable in nature and direct-
ing that the issues it raised (including those in common with the counter-
claim) be tried to the court before a jury determined the remaining issues
raised by Beacon's counterclaim. As a result, issues critical to the counter-
claim-including whether Beacon was in substantial competition with Fox
in the San Bernadino area and whether the clearances were reasonable-
would be decided by the court. 64
action."').
160. See id. at R. 18(a) ("A party asserting a claim to relief... may join, either as inde-
pendent or as alternate claims, as many claims, legal, equitable, or maritime, as the party has
against an opposing party."). Initially, this provision mentioned only legal and equitable
claims. The reference to maritime claims was added in 1966, when the Rules of Civil Proce-
dure were made applicable in admiralty cases. See generally Leavenworth Colby, Admiralty
Unification, 54 GEO. L.J. 1258 (1966); Brainerd Currie, Unification of the Civil and Admi-
ralty Rules: Why and How, 17 MAINE L. REv. 1 (1965).
161. 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
162. 369 U.S. 469 (1962).
163. 396 U.S. 531 (1970).
164. Beacon Theatres, 359 U.S. at 502-04.
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit refused a writ
of mandamus. While recognizing that the trial judge's determination of the
common issues would be preclusive with respect to Beacon's counter-
claim, 65 the appellate court concluded that there was no Seventh Amend-
ment violation because a chancellor could have done precisely the same
thing prior to merger:
[T]he Rules of Civil Procedure... were not designed to make any sub-
stantial change in the right to jury trial or to alter any pre-existing right
of the trial judge to determine in his discretion whether trial of the suit in
equity shall be prior to the submission of the issues in the legal action in
any case where, as here, both types of action are presented by the plead-
ings. 166
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed. Justice Black, writ-
ing for the majority, emphasized that "[t]he basis for injunctive relief in the
federal courts has always been irreparable harm and inadequacy of legal
remedies" and that the meaning of these terms "must be determined, not by
precedents decided under discarded procedures, but in light of the remedies
now made available by the Declaratory Judgment Act and the Federal
Rules."I 67 He continued:
[T]he expansion of adequate legal remedies provided by the Declaratory
Judgment Act and the Federal Rules necessarily affects the scope of eq-
uity. Thus, the justification for equity's deciding legal issues once it ob-
tains jurisdiction, and refusing to dismiss a case, merely because subse-
quently a legal remedy becomes available, must be re-evaluated in the
light of the liberal joinder provisions of the Federal Rules which allow
legal and equitable causes to be brought and resolved in one civil action.
Similarly the need for, and therefore, the availability of such equitable
remedies as Bills of Peace, Quia Timet and Injunction must be reconsid-
165. Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 252 F.2d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 1958) (if the sub-
stantial competition issue is tried first by the court, "the determination of that issue by the
court will operate either by way of res judicata or collateral estoppel so as to conclude both
parties with respect thereto at the subsequent trial of [Beacon's] treble damage claim").
166. Id. at 875. The Ninth Circuit relied on American Life Insurance Co. v. Stewart, 300
U.S. 203 (1937), for the proposition that a court of equity could retain jurisdiction, even
though a legal remedy subsequently became available, and had discretion to enjoin the later
lawsuit in order to allow the entire dispute to be resolved in one court. Beacon Theatres, 252
F.2d at 876. The court also said that "[n]o authority need be cited" for the proposition that "a
party who is entitled to maintain a suit in equity for an injunction may have the issues therein
determined by the court without a jury notwithstanding they involve a trial and determination
of legal rights." Id. at 874.
167. Beacon Theatres, 359 U.S. at 506-07.
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ered in view of the existence of the Declaratory Judgment Act as well as
the liberal joinder provision of the Rules.168
In undertaking this reevaluation, Justice Black concluded that a trial
judge's discretion to decide the equitable claim first "is very narrowly lim-
ited and must, wherever possible, be exercised to preserve jury trial."'169
That discretion is indeed narrow: "only under the most imperative circum-
stances, circumstances which in view of the flexible procedures of the Fed-
eral Rules we cannot now anticipate, can the right to a jury trial of legal
issues be lost through prior determination of equitable claims." 170 This is so
because "the right to jury trial is a constitutional one . . . , while no similar
requirement protects trial by the court."' 7' Presumably, Beacon Theatres
could have been decided on the ground that the district court abused its dis-
cretion by trying the equitable claim first, because "Fox may have been
simply trying to circumvent Beacon's jury right by 'jumping the gun' with
an equitable action." 172 But the Court embarked on a rather different course,
one that Professor James found disturbing because the stated grounds for the
decision "are cloudy and ambiguous and susceptible of an interpretation
which would go far to abolish the historical test altogether and extend jury
trial over most of the former domain of equity."'
73
While this statement is something of an exaggeration, the Beacon
Theatres decision has been applied by the lower federal courts beyond its
fact pattern, i.e., the plaintiff asserts an equitable claim and the defendant a
compulsory counterclaim legal in nature. The same result has been reached
when the counterclaim is permissive, 74 and there is a right to a jury trial on
common issues when the plaintiff brings a legal claim and the defendant
raises an affirmative defense cognizable only in equity. 175 The rationale of
Beacon Theaters has also been employed when the plaintiff, as allowed by
168. Id. at 509.
169. Id. at 510.
170. Id. at 510-11.
171. Id. at 510. Justice Stewart, joined by Justices Harlan and Whittaker, dissented. In
Justice Stewart's view, the merger of law and equity did not change anything insofar as the
Seventh Amendment was concerned. He argued that nothing in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure deprive district courts of their discretion to "order the trial of a suit in equity in
advance of an action at law between the same parties, even if there is a factual issue common
to both." Id. at 517 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Neither the rules nor the Declaratory Judgment
Act "create a right of trial by jury where that right 'does not exist under the Constitution,"'
and the rules "were not intended to undermine the basic structure of equity jurisprudence
developed over the centuries." Id. at 518-19.
172. James, supra note 116, at 687.
173. Id.
174. 9 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 31, § 2305.
175. See, e.g., Granite States Ins. Co. v. Smart Modular Tech., Inc., 76 F.3d 1023, 1027
(9th Cir. 1996) (equitable estoppel).
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Rule 18(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, asserts both legal and
equitable claims that have common issues of fact. 1
76
2. Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood
The owners of the trademark "Dairy Queen" sued the licensee of the
trademark for breach of the licensing agreement. 77 According to the com-
plaint, the licensee had failed to make the agreed-upon payments for use of
the trademark and had continued to use it-and to collect money for that
use-after its right to do so had terminated. The owners sought a declaration
that the contract was null and void, an accounting of the profits unlawfully
obtained by the licensees, and a permanent injunction to restrain the licen-
sees from using the trademark. The district court struck the licensee's de-
mand for a jury trial, describing the owners' case as "purely equitable" or in
any event one within equity jurisdiction if viewed as "a claim to injunctive
relief coupled with an incidental claim for damages."' 78 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit denied mandamus without opinion,'
79
but the Supreme Court reversed.
Again writing for the Court,180 Justice Black characterized the owners'
demand for monetary relief as legal in nature, rejecting their contention that
the "accounting" label made it equitable. This was not a case in which the
accounts were so complicated that "only a court of equity can satisfactorily
unravel them"--indeed, it will be a "rare case" in which the jury cannot
handle the task alone.' 8' Justice Black emphasized that "the constitutional
right to trial by jury cannot be made to depend upon the choice of words
used in the pleadings."'
' 82
So viewed, the case was one in which the plaintiff owners sought both
legal and equitable remedies for a single wrong, with the former "inciden-
tal" to the latter and thus within the cleanup doctrine. Justice Black's opin-
ion reflects the strong federal preference for trial by jury and condemns the
cleanup doctrine as constitutionally unacceptable:
[W]e may dispose of one of the grounds upon which the trial court acted
in striking the demand for trial by jury-that based upon the view that
176. See, e.g., Wade v. Orange County Sheriff's Office, 844 F.2d 951, 954 (2d Cir.
1988); Pfizer, Inc. v. Perrigo Co., 988 F. Supp. 686, 696 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
177. Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 473-74 (1962).
178. McCullough v. Dairy Queen, Inc., 194 F. Supp. 686, 687-88 (E.D. Pa. 1961).
179. Dairy Queen, 369 U.S. at 470.
180. Justice Stewart, who dissented in Beacon Theatres, concurred in the result without
opinion. Justice Harlan, who had joined the Stewart dissent, concurred with a brief opinion.
Justices Frankfurter and White did not participate. Id. at 480.
181. Id. at 478.
182. Id. at 477-78.
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the right to trial by jury may be lost as to legal issues where those issues
are characterized as "incidental" to equitable issues-for our previous
decisions make it plain that no such rule may be applied in the federal
courts.
1 8 3
Thus, the defendant licensees were entitled to a jury trial "on factual is-
sues related to the question of whether there has been a breach of con-
tract."' 84 Because these legal issues "are common with those upon which
[plaintiffs'] claim to equitable relief is based, the legal claims involved in
the action must be determined prior to any final court determination of
[plaintiffs'] equitable claims."'85
The "previous decisions" to which Justice Black referred are Scott v.
Neely,18 6 an 1891 case from which he quoted, and Cates v. Allen, 8 7 a deci-
sion reaffirming Scott two years later. The Court in Scott "held that a court
of equity could not even take jurisdiction of a suit 'in which a claim prop-
erly cognizable only at law is united in the same pleadings with a claim for
equitable relief."",18 8 This holding, Justice Black said, was based on "the
historical separation between law and equity and the duty of the Court to
insure 'that the right to a trial by jury in the legal action may be preserved
intact." , 8 9 Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ended this "his-
torical separation" by merging law and equity, they "did not... purport to
change the basic holding of Scott that the right to trial by jury of legal
claims must be preserved.'0
90
The Court's reliance on Scott and Neely is problematic. As Professor
James pointed out, these cases represent only one of the patterns followed
by equity, the one discussed previously in Part III.A.2 of this article. More-
over, "what is said is true, historically, only of that pattern."'9' In the pat-
terns represented by Dairy Queen and Beacon Theatres, Professor James
183. Id. at 470.
184. Id. at 479.
185. Dairy Queen, 369 U.S. at 479. The Court was careful to point out that the order-of-
trial rule "does not... interfere with the District Court's power to grant temporary relief
pending a final adjudication on the merits." Id. at 479 n.20. A preliminary injunction had
been issued by the district court in this case. See McCullough v. Dairy Queen, Inc., 194 F.
Supp. 686, 686-87 (E.D. Pa. 1961).
186. 140U.S. 106 (1891).
187. 149 U.S. 451 (1893).
188. Dairy Queen, 369 U.S. at 471 (quoting Scott v. Neely, 140 U.S. 106, 117 (1891)).
189. Id. (quoting Scott, 140 U.S. at 110).
190. Id. at 471-72. As Justice Black pointed out, Rule 38(a) expressly provides that the
right to trial by jury "as declared by the Seventh Amendment... shall be preserved to the
parties inviolate." Id. at 472 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 38(a)).
191. James, supra note 116, at 688 n.189 (emphasis in original).
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wrote, "equity would frequently have tried without a jury the very kinds of
legal issues which were presented in those cases."
' 192
3. Ross v. Bernhard
Stockholders of the Lehman Corporation brought a derivative action in
federal district court alleging gross negligence, abuse of trust, breach of
fiduciary duty, waste, conversion of corporate assets by the board of direc-
tors, and breach of contract and fiduciary duty by the corporation's brokers.
The plaintiffs sought an accounting and repayment to the corporation of
excessive brokerage commissions. The district court held that the right of
the plaintiffs to a jury trial was to be determined as if the corporation were
itself the plaintiff but certified the question to the court of appeals.' 93 The
Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that because a derivative
action is entirely equitable in nature, there is no right to a jury trial on any
issue.' 
94
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice White, agreed with the
district court: "the right to jury trial attaches to those issues in derivative
actions as to which the corporation, if it had been suing in its own right,
would have been entitled to a jury.' 195 Although he conceded the histori-
cally equitable nature of the derivative suit, Justice White stressed that the
corporation is the real party in interest and the shareholder a nominal plain-
tiff. The proceeds "belong to the corporation," and the "heart of the action is
the corporate claim."'' 96 "If it presents a legal issue, one entitling the corpo-
ration to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment, the right to a jury is not
forfeited merely because the stockholder's right to sue must first be adjudi-
cated as an equitable issue triable to the court."' 9 7 Put another way, "legal
claims are not magically converted into equitable issues by their presenta-
tion to a court of equity in a derivative suit.' 98
The difficulty with this approach was identified by Justice Stewart in
dissent. 199 A derivative suit, he pointed out, "has in practice always been
treated as a single cause tried exclusively in equity. ' '2°° By way of example,
he cited United Copper Securities Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 201 in
192. Id.
193. Ross v. Bernhard, 275 F. Supp. 569, 570-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
194. Ross v. Bernhard, 403 F.2d 909, 914-15 (2d Cir. 1968).
195. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 532-33 (1970).
196. Id. at 538-39.
197. Id. at 539.
198. Id. at 538.
199. He was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Harlan. Id. at 543 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
200. Id. at 546.
201. 244 U.S. 261 (1917).
[Vol. 24
RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL AFTER MERGER
which Justice Brandeis noted "the long-settled rule under which stockhold-
ers may [enforce rights of the corporation] only in a court of equity.' 20 2 Jus-
tice Stewart criticized the majority for disregarding "history, logic, and over
100 years of firm precedent," 20 3 adding that the decision "can perhaps be
explained as a reflection of an unarticulated but apparently overpowering
bias in favor of jury trials in civil actions.2
The Ross decision cannot logically be confined to derivative suits. In-
deed, Justice White said that "it now seems settled in the lower federal
courts that class action plaintiffs may obtain a jury trial on any legal issues
they present.,20 5 He added in a footnote that interpleader and intervention,
both historically equitable devices, "are used under the [Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure] without depriving the parties employing them of the right to a jury
trial on legal issues., 20 6 Consequently, it appears that the Court's decision in
Liberty Oil Co. v. Condon National Bank207- that there was no constitu-
tional right to a jury trial in interpleader suits-has been effectively over-
ruled.208 To again quote Justice White, "courts and commentators have now
come to the conclusion that the right to a jury should not turn on how the
parties happen to be brought before the court.
' 209
The Ross decision is also important because it emphasizes that the right
to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment "depends on the nature of the
issue to be tried rather than the character of the overall action."210 A well-
known footnote in the opinion elaborates:
As our cases indicate, the "legal" nature of an issue is determined by
considering, frst, the pre-merger custom with reference to such ques-
tions; second, the remedy sought; and third, the practical abilities and
limitations of juries. Of these factors, the first, requiring extensive and
possibly abstruse historical inquiry, is obviously the most difficult to ap-
ply.211
The third factor has led to a debate in the courts and the legal literature
as to whether there is a "complexity exception" to the Seventh Amend-
202. Id. at 265.
203. Ross, 396 U.S. at 544 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
204. Id. at 551.
205. Id. at 541.
206. Id. at 541 n.15.
207. 260 U.S. 235 (1922).
208. Hyde Props. v. McCoy, 507 F.2d 301, 305 (6th Cir. 1974); see also 9 WRIGHT &
MILLER, supra note 31, § 2307 (Ross is "controlling not only for derivative actions but also
for the other procedural devices that the Civil Rules borrowed from equity").
209. Ross, 396 U.S. at 541 n.15.
210. Id. at 538.
211. Id. at 538 n.10.
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ment,212 but the Supreme Court has not yet settled the matter. In Markman
v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,213 the Court concluded that judges, rather
than juries, are more qualified to interpret a patent claim, the portion of the
patent document that "defines the scope of the patentee's rights. 2t 4 Al-
though the Court assessed the relative abilities of judges and juries to decide
this highly technical question, 21 5 Markman "does not establish an outright
complexity exception., 216 Indeed, the Court said that "[w]e need not...
consider here whether our conclusion that the Seventh Amendment does not
require terms of art in patent claims to be submitted to the jury supports a
similar result in other types of cases. 217
4. Other Decisions
The Supreme Court has had a particularly difficult time determining
whether there is a right to trial by jury when Congress has created a statu-
tory cause of action. No problems occur when the statute specifically pro-
vides for a jury trial, for Congress may grant such a right even though the
Seventh Amendment does not.218 But what if the statute is silent on the
question? The Seventh Amendment right attaches when a statute simply
codifies a common law cause of action,2'9 but the situation becomes murky
when a statute creates rights and liabilities unknown at common law.
212. Compare In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980)
(recognizing complexity exception grounded in due process) with In re U.S. Fin. Sec. Litig.,
609 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979) (refusing to recognize complexity exception); see also Morris
S. Arnold, A Historical Inquiry into the Right to Trial by Jury in Complex Civil Litigation,
128 U. PA. L. REv. 829 (1980); Richard 0. Lempert, Civil Juries and Complex Cases: Let's
Not Rush to Judgment, 80 MICH. L. REv. 68 (1981); Joseph A. Miron, Jr., Note, The Consti-
tutionality of a Complexity Exception to the Seventh Amendment, 73 CHi.-KENT. L. REv. 865
(1998); Note, The Right to a Jury Trial in Complex Civil Litigation, 92 HARV. L. REv. 898
(1979).
213. 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
214. Id. at 372.
215. Id. at 388-90.
216. 9 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 31, § 2302.1 (Supp. 2000). As Professors Wright
and Miller noted, Markham does not discuss, or even cite, the Ross footnote. They added that
"the language of the opinion suggests that the functional inquiry [as to whether judges or
juries are better equipped to decide the issue] is only relevant when the historical inquiry
provides no answers." Id.
217. Markham, 517 U.S. at 383 n.9.
218. E.g., The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 459-60
(1851) (upholding constitutionality of statute providing for right to jury trial in admiralty
proceeding).
219. Justice Story made the point early on: the Seventh Amendment "may well be con-
strued to embrace all suits which are not of equity and admiralty jurisdiction, whatever may
be the peculiar form which they may assume to settle legal rights." Parsons v. Bedford, 28
U.S. (3 Pet.) 433,447 (1830).
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With respect to the latter, one possible solution would be to hold, in
rather straightforward fashion, that there can be no right to a jury trial be-
cause the statute was not a creature of the common law. A statement by the
Supreme Court in a case mentioned previously, NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
220Steel Corp., suggests such an approach: the Seventh Amendment does not
apply in a statutory proceeding "unknown to the common law.",221 But this
case was subsequently recast as one involving a different question, i.e., the
power of Congress to assign cases to non-Article III courts or administrative
agencies. 222 In any event, the Court has rejected a rigidly historical approach
in favor of a more complex inquiry. As Justice Kennedy explained in City of
Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd. :223
We ask, first, whether we are dealing with a cause of action that either
was tried at law [in the eighteenth century] or is at least analogous to one
that was. If the action in question belongs in the law category, we then
ask whether the particular trial decision must fall to the jury in order to
preserve the substance of the common-law right as it existed in 1791. 224
In the Monterey case, the plaintiff developers brought an action under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming that the city, by denying their proposals to de-
velop a parcel of land, had effected a regulatory taking without paying com-
pensation. They sought damages for the unconstitutional denial of such
compensation. The Court held that a § 1983 action for a violation of consti-
tutional rights, which had no equivalent at common law, "sound[s] in tort"
and that the plaintiffs' claim for "monetary relief' is legal in nature. Thus,
"a suit for legal relief brought under the statute is an action at law., 225
But to say that plaintiffs had a right to a jury trial is not to say that they
were entitled to have a jury decide every issue. Here the jury had been asked
to determine the city's liability for the alleged taking by answering two
220. 301 U.S. 1 (1937); see supra text accompanying notes 154-55.
221. Jones &Laughlin, 301 U.S. at48.
222. See Atlas Roofing Co. v. OSHA, 430 U.S. 442, 455 (1977) (Jones & Laughlin and
other cases "stand clearly for the proposition that when Congress creates new statutory 'pub-
lic rights,' it may assign their adjudication to an administrative agency with which a jury trial
would be incompatible, without violating the Seventh Amendment's injunction that jury trial
is to be 'preserved' in 'suits at common law'); Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 194 (1974)
(Jones & Laughlin "stands for the proposition that the Seventh Amendment is generally
inapplicable in administrative proceedings, where jury trials would be incompatible with the
whole concept of administrative adjudication").
223. 526 U.S. 687 (1999).
224. Id. at 708 (internal citation and quotations omitted). Although the Court was frag-
mented as to the result, it was unanimous with respect to the applicable test. See id. at 723
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); id. at 733 (Souter, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part).
225. Id. at 710.
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questions: whether the developers had been deprived of "all economically
viable use" of their property and whether the city's rejection of their build-
ing plans "substantially advance[d] a legitimate public purpose. 22 6 In hold-
ing that the developers had a right to a jury trial on these issues, the Court
first pointed out that "in suits sounding in tort for money damages, ques-
tions of liability were decided by the jury, rather than the judge, in most
cases.' 227 Moreover, the two issues were "predominantly factual" and "es-
sentially fact-bound," respectively, and thus for the jury.228
The fact that four Justices dissented in Monterey suggests that the
Court's method of analysis in this area is far easier to state than to apply.
Justice Souter, joined by Justices O'Connor, Ginsburg, and Breyer, agreed
with the Court's "test" but dissented from its application. 229 He argued that
the "closest analogue" to the claim for regulatory taking is an action for
condemnation and that "the right to compensation for such direct takings
carried with it no right to a jury trial., 230 Even though condemnation pro-
ceedings are "suits at common law" within the meaning of the Seventh
Amendment, Justice Souter said that there is no right to trial by jury because
they "carried no uniform and established right to a common law jury trial in
England or the colonies at the time . . . the Seventh Amendment was
adopted., 2
31
Another example of the difficulty in employing this approach is Tull v.
United States, 232 in which the Court held that the Seventh Amendment re-
quires a jury trial in liability determinations in actions by the government
for civil penalties under the Clean Water Act. This action was analogous to
a legal action for debt, the Court said, and a civil penalty was a remedy that
could be enforced only in courts of law.233 However, the Court held that
there was no right to a jury trial with regard to the assessment of the pen-
alty, a process that involved "multiple factors" and "highly discretionary
calculations" of the kind "traditionally performed by judges. '234 Justice
Scalia, joined by Justice Stevens, dissented in part, arguing that both issues
should be tried by the jury. "[T]he Court creates a form of civil adjudication
I have never encountered," Justice Scalia wrote. "I can recall no precedent
226. Id. at 700.
227. Id. at 718.
228. Id. at 720-21.
229. Monterey, 526 U.S. at 734-35 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
230. Id. at 739.
231. Id. at 738 (internal quotation omitted); see also Atlas Roofing Co. v. OSHA, 430
U.S. 442, 458 (1977) ("Condemnation was a suit at common law but constitutionally could
be tried without a jury."); United States v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14, 18 (1970) ("[T]here is no
constitutional right to a jury in eminent domain proceedings.").
232. 481 U.S. 412 (1987).
233. Id. at 420-22.
234. Id. at 427.
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for judgment of civil liability by jury but assessment of amount by the
court."
2 35
The Court has also split in considering a different question, i.e.,
whether a determination by the judge in an equitable proceeding has preclu-
sive effect in a subsequent legal action. This issue arose in Parklane Ho-
siery Co. v. Shore,236 a stockholder's class action for damages against a cor-
poration and its officers and directors based on the issuance of an allegedly
false and misleading proxy statement. Before this case went to trial, the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) sued the same defendants on
the basis of the proxy statement, seeking injunctive relief. In the latter pro-
ceeding, the district court held that the proxy statement was indeed materi-
ally false and misleading. The plaintiff in the class action then moved for
partial summary judgment, arguing that the defendants were collaterally
estopped from relitigating the falsity issue that had been resolved against
them in the suit brought by the SEC. The district court denied the motion on
the ground that application of collateral estoppel in this context would deny
defendants their Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. The Seventh Cir-
cuit reversed, and the Supreme Court upheld the appellate court's decision.
Writing for the majority, Justice Stewart first concluded that this "of-
fensive" use of collateral estoppel by a litigant who was not a party to the
prior action should be permitted in the federal courts. 217 He then determined
that using collateral estoppel in this fashion would not violate the Seventh
Amendment, even though litigants in the defendants' position would have
had trial by jury in 1791, when the doctrine of mutuality prevented collat-
eral estoppel from being employed offensively. 238 "The law of collateral
estoppel, like the law in other procedural areas defining the scope of the
jury's function, has evolved since 1791," Justice Stewart said. "[T]hese de-
velopments are not repugnant to the Seventh Amendment simply for the
reason that they did not exist in 1791 .,,239 The sole dissenter was then-
235. Id. at 428 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
236. 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
237. Id. at 326-33.
238. Under the doctrine of mutuality, collateral estoppel was permitted only when the
parties in the first action were identical to, or in privity with, the parties in the subsequent
action. See Smith v. Kemochen, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 198, 217-18 (1849); Hopkins v. Lee, 19
U.S. (6 Wheat.) 109, 113-14 (1821). This remained so in the federal courts until 1971, when
the Supreme Court abrogated it with respect to defensive collateral estoppel. Blonder-Tongue
Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of I1l. Found., 401 U.S. 313 (1971). The Arkansas Supreme Court abol-
ished mutuality in Fisher v. Jones, 311 Ark. 450, 457, 844 S.W.2d 954, 958 (1993), but has
not yet decided whether to permit offensive collateral estoppel. The court observed in Fisher
that use of the doctrine offensively "is more controversial, and not at issue in this case." Id. at
456, 844 S.W.2d at 958.
239. Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 337. It is somewhat ironic that Justice Stewart relied
in part on Beacon Theatres, a case in which he had dissented. See Beacon Theatres, Inc. v.
Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 512 (1959) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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Justice Rehnquist: "the development of nonmutual estoppel is a substantial
departure from the common law and its use in this case completely deprives
[defendants] of their right to have a jury determine contested issues of
fact.,
240
V. WHAT ABOUT ARKANSAS?
Because the Seventh Amendment applies only in the federal courts, the
states are free to go their own way insofar as the right to trial by jury is con-
cerned. Not surprisingly, they have not taken the same path. Commentators
have suggested that a majority of states follow the flexible approach on
facts similar to those of Beacon Theatres and Dairy Queen,24' but a substan-
tial minority adhere to a rigidly historical view.242 In the latter group of
states, the action as a whole is characterized as essentially equitable or legal
in nature; if it is equitable, the trial court may decide any incidental legal
240. Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 350 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
241. See, e.g., I DAN B. DOBBS, REMEDIES § 2.6(4), at 172-73 (2d ed. 1993); Bruce D.
Greenberg & Gary K. Wolinetz, The Right to a Civil Jury Trial in New Jersey, 47 RUTGERS
L. REV. 1461, 1501 n.224 (1995). Cases that follow Beacon Theatres include: Shope v. Sims,
658 P.2d 1336, 1340 (Alaska 1983); Cerrito v. Kovitch, 457 So. 2d 1021, 1022-23 (Fla.
1984); Harada v. Bums, 445 P.2d 376, 382 (Haw. 1968); Higgins v. Barnes, 530 A.2d 724,
725-26 (Md. 1987); Evans Fin. Corp. v. Strasser, 664 P.2d 986, 989 (N.M. 1983); Johnson v.
S.C. Nat'l Bank, 354 S.E.2d 895, 897 (S.C. 1986); First W. Bank v. Livestock Yards Co.,
466 N.W.2d 853, 856-57 (S.D. 1991); Zions First Nat'l Bank v. Rocky Mountain Irrigation,
Inc., 795 P.2d 658, 661-62 (Utah 1990); Wood v. Wood, 693 A.2d 673, 675 (Vt. 1997).
Decisions recognizing a right to trial by jury in the fact pattern presented by Dairy Queen
include: Selby Constructors, Inc. v. McCarthy, 154 Cal. Rptr. 164, 169-70 (Ct. App. 1979);
Chenery v. Crans, 497 So. 2d 267, 269 (Fla. App. 1986); Life for God's Stray Animals, Inc.
v. New N. Rockdale County Homeowners Ass'n, 322 S.E.2d 239, 241 (Ga. 1984); Gray v.
City of Billings, 689 P.2d 268, 272 (Mont. 1984); Rexnord, Inc. v. Ferris, 657 P.2d 673, 679
n.4 (Or. 1983); Bendick v. Cambio, 558 A.2d 941, 945 (R.I. 1989); Perilli v. Bd. of Educ.,
387 S.E.2d 315, 317 (W. Va. 1989).
242. Cases contrary to Beacon Theatres include: Savage Lateral Ditch Water Users Ass'n
v. Pulley, 869 P.2d 554, 565 (Idaho 1993); First Nat'l Bank of Olathe v. Clark, 602 P.2d
1299, 1303 (Kan. 1979); Lyn-Anna Props., Ltd. v. Harborview Dev. Corp., 678 A.2d 683,
689-93 (N.J. 1996); Murphy v. Murphy, 595 N.W.2d 571, 575 (N.D. 1999); Rosenberg v.
Rosenberg, 419 A.2d 167, 168-69 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980). Decisions that do not follow Dairy
Queen include: Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. O'Neill, 523 A.2d 486, 493 (Conn. 1987);
Hiatt v, Yergin, 284 N.E.2d 834, 847-49 (Ind. Ct. App. 1972); Clark, 602 P.2d at 1303;
Linville v. Wilson, 628 S.W.2d 422, 425-26 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982). For a particularly curious
case, see Smith v. University of Detroit, 378 N.W.2d 511 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985) (when issue
of fact is common to legal and equitable claims, jury and judge make separate factual deter-
minations, leading to the possibility of contradictory findings). In Tennessee, there is no right
to trial by jury in "essentially equitable actions" unless they were triable to a jury when the
state constitution was adopted in 1796, but the legislature has "provide[d] a broad statutory
right to a jury trial in equity cases." Sasser v. Averitt Express, Inc., 839 S.W.2d 422, 434
(Tenn. App. 1992).
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issues pursuant to the cleanup doctrine.24 3 The jury is still out, so to speak,
with respect to Ross v. Bernhard. As the Iowa Supreme Court recently ob-
served, "[w]hether the plaintiff in a shareholder's derivative suit is entitled
to a jury is a fairly unsettled question across the country."244
For its part, the Arkansas Supreme Court will not be writing on an en-
tirely blank slate in determining the effect of merger on the right to trial by
jury. Pre-merger decisions generally reflect the sort of rigidity that would
suggest rejection of Beacon Theatres and its progeny. On the other hand,
there is some indication that the court may not be entirely hostile to a more
flexible approach. These decisions are discussed after a brief examination of
the historical test that has emerged for construing Article II, Section 7 of the
Arkansas Constitution.
A. The Historical Test: In General
In guaranteeing that the right to trial by jury "shall remain inviolate, 245
the drafters of the 1836 Constitution appear to have had preservation in
243. See, e.g., O'Neill, 523 A.2d at 493; Howell v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 530
N.E.2d 318, 319 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988); Clark, 602 P.2d at 1303; Boardwalk Props., Inc. v.
BPHC Acquisition, Inc., 602 A.2d 733, 739-40 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1991); Barnhart Drilling Co.
v. Petroleum Fin., Inc., 807 P.2d 411, 415 (Wyo. 1991). This approach also prevailed in the
federal courts prior to Beacon Theatres and its progeny. See 9 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note
31, § 2302.
244. Weltzin v. Nail, 618 N.W.2d 293, 296 (Iowa 2000). The court, which rejected Ross,
said later in its opinion that the "national trend appears to agree with the Ross dissent." Id. at
301. The cases, however, are rather evenly divided. Those adopting the Ross approach in-
clude: Fin., Inv. & Rediscount Co. v. Wells, 409 So. 2d 1341, 1344 (Ala. 1982) (on rehear-'
ing); Hashem v. Taheri, 571 A.2d 837, 839-40 (Md. App. 1990); Scott v. Woods, 730 P.2d
480, 486 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986); Fedoryszyn v. Weiss, 310 N.Y.S.2d 55, 57 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1970); Hyatt Bros., Inc. v. Hyatt, 769 P.2d 329, 333-36 (Wyo. 1989). Among the cases hold-
ing that there is no right to a jury trial are: Rankin v. Frebank Co., 121 Cal. Rptr. 348, 359
(Ct. App. 1975); Lanman Lithotech, Inc. v. Gurwitz, 478 So. 2d 425, 427 (Fla. App. 1985);
Demoulas v. Demoulas Super Mkts., Inc., 677 N.E.2d 159, 178 (Mass. 1997); Pelfrey v.
Bank of Greer, 244 S.E.2d 315, 316-17 (S.C. 1978). See generally Jean E. Maess, Annota-
tion, Right to Trial by Jury in Stockholder's Derivative Action, 32 A.L.R.4th 111 (1984).
245. This phrase appears in several state constitutions. E.g., ALA. CONST. art. I, § 11;
ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 23; CONN. CONST. art. I, § 19; GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, 1 XI; IDAHO
CONST. art. 1, § 7; IND. CONST. art. I, § 20; IOWA CONST. art. I, § 9;, MINN. CONST. art. I, § 4;
MISS. CONST. art. III, § 31; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 6; N.J. CONST. art. I, 9; ORE. CONST. art. I,
§ 17; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 15; S.D. CONST. art. IV, § 6; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 6; TEX. CONST.
art. I, § 15; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 21; WIs. CoNST. art. I, § 5. Variations are used in other
states. E.g., FLA. CONST. art. I, § 22 ("shall be secure to all and remain inviolate"); KAN.
CONST. Bill of Rights, § 5 ("shall be inviolate"); Ky. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 7 ("shall be
held sacred, and the right thereof remain inviolate, subject to such modifications as may be
authorized by this Constitution"); MONT. CONST. art. II, § 26 ("is secured to all and shall
remain inviolate"); NEV. CONST. art. I, § 3 ("shall be secured to all and remain inviolate
forever"); N.D. CONST. art. I, § 13 ("shall be secured to all, and remain inviolate"); OHIO
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mind; that is, they sought to ensure that the right, as it had existed in the
Arkansas Territory, was not diminished or eroded by the new state's legisla-
ture and courts.246 Their view of the existing right, however, is unclear. Case
law in other jurisdictions suggests that it may have included the right to trial
by jury at common law,247 any such right created by territorial statutes,2"
and the practice under the Seventh Amendment. 249 The early Arkansas cases
focus on the common law.
250
CONST. art. I, § 5; ("shall be inviolate"); OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 19 ("shall be and remain
inviolate"); S.C. CONST. art. I, § 14 ("shall be preserved inviolate"). Some states expressly
refer to the right as it had previously existed. E.g., ILL. CONST. art. I, § 13 ("as heretofore
enjoyed shall remain inviolate"); Mo. CONST. art. I, § 22(a) ("as heretofore enjoyed shall
remain inviolate"); N.M. CONST. art. II, § 12 ("as it has heretofore existed shall be secured to
all and remain inviolate"); N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 2; ("in all cases in which it has heretofore
been guaranteed by constitutional provision shall remain inviolate forever"); PA. CONST. art.
I, § 6 ("shall be as heretofore, and the right thereof remain inviolate").
246. See Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Serv. Ctr., Inc., 908 S.W.2d 104, 108 (Ky. 1995) (the
term "inviolate" means that the right to jury trial "cannot be annulled, obstructed, impaired,
or restricted by legislative or judicial action"); State ex rel. Mullen v. Doherty, 47 P. 958,
959 (Wash. 1897) ("The effect of the declaration of the constitution.., is to provide that the
right of trial by jury as it existed in the territory at the time when the constitution was
adopted should be continued unimpaired and inviolate."); see also Olson v. Synergistic
Techs. Bus. Sys., Inc., 628 N.W.2d 142, 148 (Minn. 2001) (effect of constitutional provision
that right to trial by jury "shall remain inviolate" is "to recognize the right of trial by jury as
it existed in the Territory of Minnesota at the time of the adoption of the state constitution")
(quoting Whallon v. Bancroft, 4 Minn. 109, 113 (1860)); Power v. Williams, 205 N.W. 9, 11
(N.D. 1925) ("[T]he 'trial by jury,' which the framers of the [state] Constitution intended
should remain inviolate, was the trial by jury as it existed at and prior to adoption of... the
Constitution.").
247. E.g., Hammons v. Ehney, 924 S.W.2d 843, 849 (Mo. 1996) ("[T]his Court has
stated multiple times that the right [of trial by jury] applied to actions that existed at common
law before adoption of the first constitution."); Shaw v. Shaw, 133 N.W. 292, 293 (S.D.
1911) ("[T]he constitutional provision of this state 'that trial by jury shall remain inviolate'
... applies to law cases triable by jury as a matter of right as theretofore existed in the terri-
tory of Dakota prior to the going into effect of the Constitution of this state."); State v.
Dusina, 764 S.W.2d 766, 768 (Tenn. 1989) ("[T]he constitution preserves the right of trial by
jury as that right existed at common law insofar as that law had been adopted and was in
force in North Carolina when the territory embraced in Tennessee was ceded by North Caro-
lina to the United States government.").
248. E.g., State v. Bennion, 730 P.2d 952, 957 (Idaho 1986) (holding that state constitu-
tion "preserves the right to jury trial as it existed at the common law and under the territorial
statutes"); see also Baldwin Sod Farms, Inc. v. Corrigan, 746 So. 2d 1198, 1204 (Fla. App.
1999) (holding that constitutional provision that the "right to trial by jury shall be secure to
all and remain inviolate" applies to "those categories of actions in which the right to a jury
trial was enjoyed as of 1845, the date that Florida's first constitution became effective").
249. E.g., Md. Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Dist. Court, 455 P.2d 690, 692 (Okla. 1969); Power, 205
N.W. at 12-13. As the Oklahoma Supreme Court made plain in the Maryland National case,
the Seventh Amendment does not apply of its own force, but rather because of its application
in the territory prior to statehood and the terms of the state constitution. 455 P.2d at 692.
Thus, the states need not follow post-statehood federal decisions interpreting the Seventh
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Because the phrase "shall remain inviolate" appears in each of the sub-
sequent constitutions, one can argue that the scope of the right to jury trial
in Arkansas today turns on its scope in 1836, immediately prior to state-
hood.251 The 1868 Constitution, however, included an additional phrase that
was repeated in the 1874 document: the right of trial by jury "shall extend to
all cases at law., 252 The published proceedings of the 1868 constitutional
convention shed no light on the reasons behind this addition. 3 In an 1870
case, State v. Johnson,25 4 the supreme court asked whether the new language
added anything, but did not directly answer the question. 255 Later decisions,
however, view the phrase "at law" as a reference to the common law. For
example, the court observed that "the constitutional right to trial by jury is
Amendment. In Oklahoma, for example, the right to a jury trial in cases involving both legal
and equitable issues depends on which predominates. Butcher v. McGinn, 706 P.2d 878, 880
(Okla. 1985). This approach contrasts sharply with the Supreme Court's Seventh Amend-
ment analysis in the Beacon Theatres and Dairy Queen cases. Of course, a state is free to
adopt current Seventh Amendment thinking if it so chooses. E.g., Odden v. O'Keefe, 450
N.W.2d 707, 709 (N.D. 1990) (finding rationale of Ninth Circuit decision "persuasive").
250. E.g., Larillian v. Lane, 8 Ark. 372, 374 (1848) (holding that the constitutional right
of trial by jury refers to "the jury trial as known and recognized by the common law"); Wal-
lace v. Henry, 5 Ark. 105, 108 (1843) (pointing out that statute requiring jury in action on
written instrument where amount of damages was uncertain "does not materially change the
common law"); Willson v. Light, 4 Ark. 158, 158-59 (1843) (holding that each party is enti-
tled to trial by jury on appeal to circuit court from justice of peace in suit to recover on a
note).
251. See Goodrum v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 824 S.W.2d 6, 11 (Mo. 1992) (holding
that because the right to trial by jury "has remained the same through the four Missouri con-
stitutions," the right protected by the present constitution "is that which existed at common
law before adoption of the first constitution") (quoting Miller v. Russell, 593 S.W.2d 598,
605 (Mo. App. 1979)). In Hammons, 924 S.W.2d at 843, the Missouri Supreme Court ex-
pressly rejected other decisions of the court of appeals holding that the reference point was
1945, when the current constitution was adopted. Id. at 848-49; see also Corrigan, 746 So.
2d at 1204 (constitutional provision that the "right to trial by jury shall be secure and remain
inviolate" applies to "those categories of actions in which the right to a jury trial was enjoyed
as of 1845, the date that Florida's first constitution became effective"). Even when constitu-
tional provisions change over time, courts have occasionally found a common thread running
back to the territorial period. E.g., People v. Antkoviak, 619 N.W.2d 18, 28-36 (Mich. Ct.
App. 2000).
252. ARK. CONST. of 1874 art. II, § 7; ARK. CONST. of 1868 art. II, § 6.
253. There appears to have been no debate on the trial by jury provision, which was
proposed by the Committee on Preamble and Bill of Rights. DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF
THE CONVENTION 354 (James M. Pomeroy ed., 1868). The Committee on the Constitution, Its
Arrangement and Phraseology, placed the provision in a different section but made no
change in its language. Id. at 584. The constitutional text drafted by the latter committee was
approved by the delegates. Id. at 684.
254. 26 Ark. 281 (1870).
255. Id. at 289. The court not only discussed the common law at some length, id. at 290-
93, but also relied on a case arising under the 1836 Constitution, State v. Ashley, I Ark. 279
(1839), in support of its conclusion that there had been no violation of the right to trial by
jury. Johnson, 26 Ark. at 289.
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confined to cases which by the common law were so triable., 256 Put some-
what differently, "[t]he right of trial by jury extends to all cases in which
legal rights are to be ascertained and determined, in contradistinction to
those where equitable rights alone were recognized and equitable remedies
administered. 257 In two of the three other states that use the "cases at law"
256. Wheat v. Smith, 50 Ark. 267, 275, 7 S.W. 161, 164 (1887); accord Granquist v.
Randolph, 326 Ark. 809, 813, 934 S.W.2d 224, 226 (1996); Dunn v. Davis, 291 Ark. 492,
495, 725 S.W.2d 853, 855 (1987); Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Matlock, 205 Ark. 286, 290, 168
S.W.2d 424, 426 (1943); Sharum v. Meriwether, 156 Ark. 331, 334, 246 S.W. 501, 502
(1923); Mo. Pac. R.R. Co. v. Conway County Bridge Dist., 134 Ark. 292, 298, 204 S.W.
630, 631 (1918); Furth v. State, 72 Ark. 161, 166, 78 S.W. 759, 760 (1904); State v. Chur-
chill, 48 Ark. 426, 436, 3 S.W. 352, 357 (1886); Williams v. Citizens, 40 Ark. 290, 297
(1883); see also McClanahan v. Gibson, 296 Ark. 304, 305, 756 S.W.2d 889, 889 (1988)
(holding that because tort action "is one of those cases" that was "triable [to a jury] at com-
mon law," plaintiff had constitutional right to trial by jury regardless of amount in contro-
versy); Grimmett v. Digby, 267 Ark. 192, 194, 589 S.W.2d 579, 581 (1979) (holding that
constitutional right to trial by jury "would... prevent the General Assembly from giving the
Claims Commission exclusive jurisdiction of tort claims against state employees or offi-
cers"); Rastle v. Marion County Rural Sch. Dist., 260 Ark. 740, 742, 543 S.W.2d 923, 925
(1976) ("suit for breach of contract is a common-law action, triable by jury," while "action
for mandamus is a special proceeding, to be tried by the court"); Naperskie v. Trevillion, 202
Ark. 638, 641, 151 S.W.2d 992, 994 (1941) (holding that a defendant, who was in default in
tort action, had right to have jury assess damages); Axley v. Hammond, 185 Ark. 939, 946,
50 S.W.2d 608, 611 (1932) ("The right to trial by jury would not remain inviolate if, in [a
slander] action only cognizable in a court of law, the defendant could interpose defenses and
cause a transfer to a court of [equity], and thereby deprive the plaintiff of the right to trial by
jury."); Pearman v. Pearman, 144 Ark. 528, 531, 222 S.W. 1064, 1065 (1920) (holding that if
defendant is in possession of the disputed land, plaintiff has an adequate legal remedy in
ejectment, and to allow plaintiff to seek equitable relief in this situation would deprive de-
fendant of right to trial by jury); Starks v. Couch, 109 Ark. 534, 536-37, 160 S.W. 853, 853-
54 (1913) (stating that because replevin cases were triable by a jury at common law, circuit
court erred in refusing demand for jury trial in appeal of such a case from justice court); First
Nat'l Bank of Lake Providence v. Reinman, 93 Ark. 376, 381, 125 S.W. 443, 445 (1910)
(holding that the transfer to chancery of suit to recover against defendant as indorser on note
violated plaintiff's right to jury trial); La. & Northwest R.R. Co. v. State, 75 Ark. 434, 444,
88 S.W. 559, 562 (1905) ("In quo warranto proceedings at common law, brought to vacate
charters, trial by jury seems universally to have been accorded to determine the facts.");
Weaver v. Ark. Nat'l Bank, 73 Ark. 462, 463, 84 S.W. 510, 510 (1904) ("The issues in suit
on promissory note were purely legal, and appellant had a constitutional right to trial by
course of the common law, including trial by jury."); Cole v. Mettee, 65 Ark. 503, 507-08,
47 S.W. 407, 408 (1898) (holding that there was no basis to transfer action for ejectment to
equity docket, where no equitable relief was sought by either party; such transfer deprived
parties of their right to trial by jury); Crow v. Reed, 38 Ark. 482, 485 (1882) ("A trial of
exceptions [to a guardian's account] by a jury, in the probate court, is not contemplated by
law.").
257. Ashley v. Little Rock, 56 Ark. 391, 396, 19 S.W. 1058, 1059 (1892); accord, Starks,
109 Ark. at 537, 160 S.W. at 854; see also McKee v. Am. Trust Co., 166 Ark. 480, 489, 266
S.W. 293, 296 (1924) (finding that the defendant was not entitled to trial by jury in action by
state bank commissioner seeking injunction for violation of statute prohibiting unauthorized
corporation from using "trust company" as part of its name); Goodrum v. Planters & Merchs.
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terminology,258 the constitutional guarantee is also applicable to cases which
by statute were tried by juries in the territorial period.259
The Arkansas case law described above does not suggest that the
benchmark for the common-law right is 1874 rather than 1836; indeed, in
construing Article 11, Section 7, the supreme court from time to time relied
on cases arising under previous constitutions.260 Moreover, it is not clear
from the decisions whether the common law is that which was applied in
Arkansas or the version that prevailed at the pertinent time in England. 261
The supreme court has not discussed these issues in any depth, but a 1986
case looks to the common law of Arkansas in 1874.262 Most likely, how-
ever, the result in any given case would be the same no matter how these
questions are resolved.263
Bank of England, 102 Ark. 326, 343, 144 S.W. 198, 206 (1912) (holding the defendant did
not have right to trial by jury in proceeding to foreclose mortgage, "a subject-matter over
which the chancery court had jurisdiction"); Kirkland v. State, 72 Ark. 171, 177, 78 S.W.
770, 772 (1904) (finding no right to jury trial in "suits in equity to abate a public nuisance");
Furth, 72 Ark. at 166, 78 S.W. at 760 (stating there is no right to jury trial in summary pro-
ceeding under statute authorizing seizure and destruction of gambling devices "to suppress
the nuisance of gambling"); Hinkle v. Hinkle, 55 Ark. 583, 587, 18 S.W. 1049, 1049 (1892)
("In chancery cases there is no fight to the trial of any issue by a jury."); Churchill, 48 Ark.
at 436, 3 S.W. at 357 ("There is no right of trial by jury in cases which would have been
cognizable in courts of equity at and before the adoption of our constitution.").
258. The three states are Minnesota, South Dakota, and Wisconsin. See MINN. CONST.
art. I, § 4; S.D. CONST. art. IV, § 6; WIs. CONST. art. I, § 5.
259. Smith v. Bailen, 258 N.W.2d 118, 120 (Minn. 1977); Shaw v. Shaw, 133 N.W. 292,
293 (S.D. 1911). In Wisconsin, the supreme court has relied on territorial statutes in deter-
mining that there is no right to a jury trial in a particular case. E.g., Killingstad v. Meigs, 133
N.W. 632, 633 (Wis. 1911).
260. E.g., Kirkland, 72 Ark. at 177, 78 S.W. at 772 (citing Neel v. State, 9 Ark. 259
(1845)); Wheat, 50 Ark. at 275, 7 S.W. at 164 (citing Johnson, 26 Ark. at 281).
261. As mentioned previously, this question also arose with respect to the Seventh
Amendment, which has been construed in light of the English practice at the time of its adop-
tion in 1791. See supra text accompanying notes 141-50.
262. Colclasure v. Kan. City Life Ins. Co., 290 Ark. 585, 588, 720 S.W.2d 916, 917
(1986) ("Our current constitution was ratified in 1874, and, by that time, our common law
was replete with decisions upholding the clean-up doctrine."). The court also held prior to
merger that equity jurisdiction was "fixed and permanent" as of 1874 and could not be
"enlarged or diminished." German Nat'l Bank v. Moore, 116 Ark. 490, 493, 173 S.W. 401,
402 (1915); accord Bates v. Bates, 303 Ark. 89, 91, 793 S.W.2d 788, 790 (1990); Titan Oil
& Gas, Inc. v. Shipley, 257 Ark. 278, 290-91, 517 S.W.2d 210, 218 (1974); Nethercutt v.
Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., 248 Ark. 143, 147, 450 S.W.2d 777, 779 (1970); Patter-
son v. McKay, 199 Ark. 140, 141, 134 S.W.2d 543, 545 (1939); Marvel v. State ex rel. Mor-
row, 127 Ark. 595, 598, 193 S.W. 259, 260 (1917); Walls v. Brundidge, 109 Ark. 250, 261,
160 S.W. 230, 233 (1913); Hester v. Bourland, 80 Ark. 145, 150, 95 S.W. 992, 993 (1906);
Powell v. Miller, 30 Ark. App. 157, 161, 785 S.W.2d 37, 39 (1990). This was the approach
taken in construing the 1836 constitution as well. See Hempstead & Conway v. Watkins, 6
Ark. 317, 357 (1845).
263. In Colclasure, for example, the court cited cases dating to 1837 in holding that the
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B. Examples of Rigid View
Perhaps the most pertinent illustration of the strict historical approach
is Colclasure v. Kansas City Life Insurance Co.,264 which involved a consti-
tutional challenge to the cleanup doctrine. In that case, decided in 1986, the
plaintiff brought a foreclosure action in chancery. The defendants' separate
action in circuit court for breach of contract was transferred to chancery and
treated as a compulsory counterclaim. Because Arkansas follows the tradi-
tional view that mortgage foreclosure is an equitable proceeding, 265 the
plaintiff's action in chancery was proper. Under the cleanup doctrine, the
chancery court also had jurisdiction over the legal counterclaim.266
The supreme court rejected the defendants' argument that application
of the cleanup doctrine violated Article II, Section 7. "Our current constitu-
tion was ratified in 1874, and, by that time, our common law was replete
with decisions upholding the clean-up doctrine," Justice Dudley wrote for a
unanimous court. "The constitution was obviously drafted with full knowl-
edge of the clean-up doctrine, and the two are fully compatible.,
267
If the same case were brought in circuit court after merger, one could
argue that there should be no right to a jury trial on any issues because the
entire case would have been litigated in chancery, without a jury, before
merger. Justice Stewart's dissenting opinion in Beacon Theatres takes this
position with respect to the Seventh Amendment. He argued that the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, which merged law and equity, did not "create a
right to trial by jury where that right does not exist under the Constitution"
and "were not intended to undermine the basic structure of equity jurispru-
dence developed over the centuries."268
cleanup doctrine was well-established by 1874 and thus did not violate Article II, Section 7.
290 Ark. at 588, 720 S.W.2d at 917 (citing Saunders v. Wood, 15 Ark. 24 (1854); Price v.
State Bank, 14 Ark. 50 (1853); Dugan v. Cureton, 1 Ark. 31 (1837)). Territorial decisions do
not appear to address the doctrine, but refer to the ability of a chancery court to "do full
justice," Reno v. Wilson, 20 F. Cas. 533, 534 (Ark. Terr. 1830) (No. 11700a), and suggest
that it could resolve legal issues when "the bill allege[d] the necessity of coming into chan-
cery for a discovery." Blakeley v. Biscoe, 30 F. Cas. 966, 967 (Ark. Terr. 1831) (No. 18239).
264. 290 Ark. 585,720 S.W.2d 916 (1986).
265. Id. at 587, 720 S.W.2d at 917.
266. Id. at 587-88, 720 S.W.2d at 917; see Towell v. Shepherd, 286 Ark. 143, 146, 689
S.W.2d 564, 565 (1985) (holding that exercise of jurisdiction under cleanup doctrine is
proper only when determination of legal issues is "incidental or essential" to determination
of equitable issues).
267. Colclasure, 290 Ark. at 588, 720 S.W.2d at 917 (citing Saunders, 15 Ark. 24; Price,
14 Ark. 50; Dugan, 1 Ark. 31). For a post-1874 case, see State v. Churchill, 48 Ark. 326, 3
S.W.2d 352 (1887).
268. Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 518-19 (1959) (Stewart, J., dis-
senting).
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A second Arkansas case is suggestive of Justice Stewart's dissent in
Ross, a shareholder derivative suit. In Hames v. Cravens,269 Robinson and
Hames (husband and wife) owned one percent and forty-nine percent, re-
spectively, of the stock in a closely held Arkansas corporation. Cravens-
who owned the other fifty percent-and Hames were the corporation's only
directors. Robinson and Hames filed suit against Cravens in circuit court,
alleging fraud and breach of fiduciary duty with respect to certain proprie-
tary information. Cravens moved to dismiss, arguing that the case was actu-
ally a derivative suit to redress harm to the corporation, not to the plaintiffs
individually. The circuit court agreed and dismissed the case for want of
subject matter jurisdiction because derivative suits must be brought in chan-
cery.2 70
The supreme court affirmed, 4-3. Writing for the majority, Chief Jus-
tice Arnold said that "a shareholder's derivative suit is an equity action
maintainable in the chancery court,, 271 where, of course, there would have
been no jury. Arguably, the same result should follow in the merged system.
Because a derivative suit could have been heard only in chancery prior to
merger, the argument goes, there is no right to a jury trial if the same action
were brought today in circuit court. As Justice Stewart pointed out in his
Ross dissent, a derivative suit "has always been treated as a single cause of
action tried exclusively in equity. 272 He criticized the holding in that case-
that there is a Seventh Amendment right to jury trial on legal issues in de-
rivative suits-as inconsistent with "history, logic, and over 100 years of
firm precedent.,
273
The dissenting opinion in Hames argued for a more flexible approach.
It was written by Justice Newbern, who has since retired, and joined by Jus-
tices Brown and Corbin. Citing Ross with apparent approval,274 Justice
Newbem emphasized that the underlying claim in Hames was legal in na-
ture, as well as the fact that a closely held corporation was involved.2 " In
this situation, he contended, the court should depart from the traditional
view that derivative suits must be maintained in courts of equity:
In Arkansas, our archaic division of law and equity courts leaves us
with cases like this one in which the fundamental claim may be one at
law, but it is thrown into an equity court, regardless of the remedy
269. 332 Ark. 437, 966 S.W.2d 244 (1998).
270. Id. at 440, 966 S.W.2d at 246.
271. Id. at 441, 966 S.W.2d at 246 (citing Red Bud Realty Co. v. S., 153 Ark. 380, 241
S.W. 21 (1922)); see also Magale v. Fomby, 132 Ark. 289, 294, 201 S.W. 278, 279 (1918)
(stating that a shareholder derivative suit "is cognizable in a court of chancery").
272. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 546 (1970) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
273. Id. at 544.
274. Hames, 332 Ark. at 445, 966 S.W.2d at 249 (Newbern, J., dissenting).
275. Id. at 446-48, 966 S.W.2d at 249-50.
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sought, because two hundred years ago the law courts were not flexible
enough to allow such a case to be heard where it belonged.
There is a means to end this artificial situation when the standing
question has to do with a close corporation.
276
At least one Arkansas case can be read as holding that a derivative ac-
tion is appropriate if the underlying claim is legal rather than equitable. In
Hooper v. Ragar,277 a limited partner brought a derivative suit in circuit
court against the general partners for fraud and retention of secret profits in
connection with the sale of partnership real estate. The jury returned a ver-
dict in favor of the plaintiff. On appeal, the defendants argued that the cir-
cuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, but apparently did not base this
contention on the derivative nature of the suit. Instead, they disputed the
plaintiff's characterization of the cause of action, asserting that it was essen-
tially one for an accounting and settlement of partnership affairs and thus
within chancery jurisdiction.2 78
The supreme court rejected this argument and refused to hold that the
complaint stated an exclusively equitable cause of action.279 Although the
court did not discuss the derivative nature of the suit, its opinion suggests
that jurisdiction was proper in circuit court because the plaintiffs artfully
drafted their complaint to state a claim for fraud rather than an account-
ing.28° As Professor Matthews has pointed out, the Hooper decision can be
viewed as supporting the proposition that a shareholder's derivative suit
could be brought in circuit court "if the underlying corporate claim is sus-
ceptible of characterization as a legal one."28'
Another area in which the Arkansas Supreme Court has taken a strict
view of history involves statutory causes of action unknown at common
law. Simply put, "if an action is purely of statutory origin, it is not one aris-
ing from the common law and no jury is required., 282 A number of cases
276. Id. at 446, 966 S.W.2d at 249.
277. 289 Ark. 152, 711 S.W.2d 148 (1986).
278. Id. at 153-54, 711 S.W.2d at 149-50.
279. Id. at 154, 711 S.W.2d at 150.
280. Id., 711 S.W.2d at 150.
281. Mary Elizabeth Matthews, The Shareholder Derivative Suit in Arkansas, 52 ARK. L.
REv. 353, 395 (1999). She concluded that the law is "unclear" as to jurisdiction in derivative
suits and observed that "[t]his uncertainty seems to be just one facet of a continuing struggle
on the part of the Arkansas courts to define the parameters of chancery jurisdiction." Id. at
396.
282. NEWBERN, supra note 106, § 24-2. However, the General Assembly is free to create
a statutory right to trial by jury and has on occasion done so. E.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-17-
211 (Michie Repl. 1998) (stating that appeals from county planning boards are tried de novo
in circuit court, with right to trial by jury); id. § 14-56-425 (Michie Repl. 1998) (allowing
appeals from municipal planning boards to be tried de novo in circuit court, with right to trial
by jury); id. § 16-111-107 (Michie 1987) (allowing for jury trial in declaratory judgment
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reflect this principle,28 3 but only one will be discussed here. In Dunn v.
Davis,211 the plaintiff filed a "complaint in bastardy" alleging that the de-
fendant was the father of her child. The circuit court, sitting without a jury
in accordance with a statute,285 found that he was indeed the father. Among
other things, the defendant argued on appeal that the circuit court erred in
refusing his demand for a jury trial. The supreme court unanimously re-
jected this argument. In his opinion for the court, Justice Glaze said:
We have held that the constitutional right to trial by jury does not secure
the right in all possible instances but only in those cases that were so tri-
able at common law. Bastardy proceedings did not exist at common law,
and this proceeding is a statutory one which is not in the nature of a suit
at common law. Our legislature has provided that trials in bastardy pro-
actions when the issue would be tried by a jury in other civil actions); id. § 18-43-110 (Mi-
chie 1987) (providing for jury trial in action on laborer's lien); see also Hardin v. Norswor-
thy, 204 Ark. 943, 946, 165 S.W.2d 609, 611 (1942) (pointing out that "[t]his is not a com-
mon law action wherein trial by jury is guaranteed, nor is there a statutory provision accord-
ing such right"); Sharum v. Meriwether, 156 Ark. 331, 246 S.W. 501 (1923) (finding that the
statute governing proceedings in probate court provided for jury determination of insanity);
Chipman v. Perdue, 135 Ark. 559, 205 S.W. 892 (1918) (holding that by statute, claimant
against estate of decedent was entitled to jury trial); Wernimont v. State ex rel. Little Rock
Bar Ass'n, 101 Ark. 210, 142 S.W. 194 (1911) (finding that a statute providing for disbar-
ment proceedings against attorneys specified trial by jury). When the constitution does not
guarantee trial by jury, the scope of the right is "dependent upon the language of the statute
which confers it." Sharum, 156 Ark. at 334, 246 S.W.2d at 502.
283. E.g., Henry, Walden & Davis v. Goodman, 294 Ark. 25, 33-34, 741 S.W.2d 233,
237-38 (1987) (holding there is no right to jury trial in action under attorney's lien statute);
Whitlock v. G.P.W. Nursing Home, Inc., 283 Ark. 158, 160, 672 S.W.2d 48, 49 (1984) (stat-
ing there is no right to trial by jury in action seeking judicial review of state agency decision)
Jones v. Reed, 267 Ark. 237, 248-49, 590 S.W.2d 6, 13 (1979) (same); Scherz v. People's
Nat'l Bank, 214 Ark. 796, 798-99, 218 S.W.2d 86, 87-88 (1949) (reaffirming holding in
Sharum, 156 Ark. at 334, 246 S.W. at 502, that constitution does not require jury trial in
competency proceedings); Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Matlock, 205 Ark. 286, 290, 168 S.W.2d
424, 426 (1943) (holding that neither party was entitled to jury trial in statutory proceeding
authorizing appeal to circuit court from decision of municipal civil service commission); St.
Louis Iron Mountain & S. Ry. Co. v. Hays & Ward, 128 Ark. 471, 477, 195 S.W. 28, 31
(1917) (finding no right to jury trial in action under attorney's lien statute); Kirkland v. State,
72 Ark. 171, 177-78, 78 S.W. 770, 772 (1904) (finding jury trial not required in summary
proceeding initiated pursuant to statute for the seizure and destruction of illegal liquor);
Williams v. Citizens, 40 Ark. 290, 296-97 (1883) (stating no right to trial by jury in statutory
proceeding in circuit court to review county judge's rejection of petition to prohibit sale of
liquor within certain area); Govan v. Jackson, 32 Ark. 553, 557 (1877) (finding election
contest is statutory proceeding in which constitution does not require jury trial).
284. 291 Ark. 492, 725 S.W.2d 853 (1987).
285. The complaint had initially been filed in the county court, which at the time had
jurisdiction in bastardy cases. Pursuant to a statute then in effect, appeal was taken to circuit
court for trial de novo. The statute expressly provided that trial was to be without a jury. Id.
at 495, 725 S.W.2d at 855.
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ceedings in circuit court be conducted without a jury, and we hold that
law is constitutional.
286
The court cited but did not distinguish or overrule an earlier case taking
a rather different approach. In Waddell v. State,2 87 a paternity case was tried
to the circuit court without a jury. On appeal, the supreme court held that
defendant's motion for jury trial had been erroneously denied. The court
pointed out that prior to its repeal in 1955, a statute had provided for jury
trials in bastardy proceedings in county court. The court then said:
At common law there was no provision to affiliate a bastard child,
but the common law in that respect has been changed by statute. Gener-
ally, no one has a constitutional right to a trial by jury of any action not
so triable when the Constitution was adopted.... However, the right ex-
ists not only in cases in which it existed at common law and at the time
of the adoption of the constitutional provisions preserving it, but it exists
in cases substantially similar thereto, in which it would have existed had
they been known to the common law.
The weight of authority is that a party is entitled to a jury trial in a
bastardy proceeding when the request for such a trial is made.
288
The third sentence of this quotation is consistent with the federal approach,
which, as described previously, asks whether "a cause of action .. .was
tried at law [in the eighteenth century] or is at least analogous to one that
was."'2 8 9 The Dunn decision reflects a markedly different view.290
286. Id. at 495, 725 S.W.2d at 855 (internal quotation and citations omitted).
287. 235 Ark. 293, 357 S.W.2d 651 (1962).
288. Id. at 294, 357 S.W.2d at 652. As early as 1877, the court suggested that the right to
trial by jury applies in statutorily-created actions that "are of similar or analogous nature" to
those that existed at common law. Govan v. Jackson, 32 Ark. 553, 577 (1877); accord Kirk-
land, 72 Ark. at 177, 78 S.W. at 772.
289. City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 708 (1999)
(quoting Markman v. Westover Instrumentalities, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 376 (1996)).
290. The strict approach taken in Dunn could lead to the conclusion that the constitu-
tional right to trial by jury does not extend to actions for contribution and wrongful death. At
English common law, there was no contribution among joint tortfeasors. Merryweather v.
Nixan, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799). This was also the case in Arkansas. Criner v.
Brewer, 13 Ark. 225, 226-27 (1853); see also W.M. Bashlin Co. v. Smith, 277 Ark. 406,
422, 643 S.W.2d 526, 533 (1983); Lacewell v. Griffin, 214 Ark. 909, 912, 219 S.W.2d 227,
228-29 (1949); Commercial Cas. Ins. Co. v. Leonard, 210 Ark. 575, 576-78, 196 S.W.2d
919, 920 (1946); McCulla v. Brown, 178 Ark. 1011, 1016, 13 S.W.2d 314, 317 (1929);
Robert L. Jones, Jr., Note, I ARK. L. REV. 190 (1947). In 1941, the legislature changed the
law by enacting the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act. See ARK. CODE ANN.
§§ 16-61-201 to -212 (Michie 1987 & LEXIS Supp. 2001). Because contribution in this
situation is statutory in nature and was unknown at common law, one could argue that there
is no right to trial by jury under Article II, Section 7. See Orejel v. York Int'l Corp., Inc., 678
N.E.2d 683, 690 (11. App. 1997) ("[T]he Contribution Act is a new statutory right created by
the legislature and, as such, does not confer the [constitutional] right to a jury trial."). Under
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Finally, there is the numbers question. In 1934, the supreme court held
without much discussion that civil litigants have "the constitutional right to
a trial by a jury of twelve persons. 29' Sixty years later, the court held that a
twelve-member jury. is constitutionally required in criminal cases as well.292
a more flexible approach, a court would ask whether analogous causes of action would have
been tried to a jury prior to adoption of the state constitution. E.g., Thermos Co. v. Spence,
735 A.2d 484,486-89 (Me. 1999).
The common law also did not recognize a right of recovery for the death of a human
being killed by the negligence or wrongful act of another. Baker v. Bolton, 170 Eng. Rep.
1033 (H.L. 1808). This case "became the basis for the so-called American common law rule
that there could be no recovery for wrongful death in the absence of a statute." STUART M.
SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH § 1:1 (2d ed. 1975). In England, such a statute-
Lord Campbell's Act-was passed in 1846 and created a cause of action in favor of certain
survivors for wrongful death. See 9 & 10 Vict. Ch. 93 (1846). This act became the model for
American legislation, and in 1883 the Arkansas General Assembly adopted its version. See
1883 Ark. Acts 53; W.W. MANSFIELD, DIGEST OF THE STATUTES OF ARKANSAS, ch. 119,
§§ 5225-5226 (Mitchell & Bettis 1884). As the Arkansas Supreme Court explained: "Prior to
1883, a cause of action for injuries resulting in death did not survive the deceased person or
exist at common law, and our legislature enacted the above act obviously to give a cause of
action to the widow and next of kin and the personal representative of the deceased person."
Vines v. Ark. Power & Light Co., 232 Ark. 173, 175, 337 S.W.2d 722, 723 (1960). The
present wrongful death act is codified at Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-62-102 (Mi-
chie 1987 & LEXIS Supp. 2001). Since 1883, the statutes have contemplated trial by jury.
See id. § 16-62-102(f) ("The jury, or the court in cases tried without a jury, may fix such
damages as will be fair and just compensation."); MANSFIELD, supra, § 5226 ("[T]he jury
may give such damages as they shall deem a fair and just compensation."); Fordyce v.
McCants, 51 Ark. 509, 515, 11 S.W. 694, 695-96 (1889) (holding that trial court erred injury
instruction as to damages). Because the wrongful death action was unknown at common law,
however, there is presumably no constitutional right to a jury trial. See Leiker v. Gafford,
778 P.2d 823, 848 (Kan. 1989); Greist v. Phillips, 906 P.2d 789, 796-97 (Or. 1995).
291. W. Union Co. v. Philbrick, 189 Ark. 1082, 1084, 76 S.W.2d 97, 98 (1934). The
court relied heavily on a 1928 constitutional amendment adding to Article II, Section 7 a new
clause providing:
[I]n all jury trials in civil cases, where as many as nine of the jurors agree upon a
verdict, the verdict so agreed upon shall be returned as the verdict of such jury;
provided, however, that where a verdict is returned by less than twelve jurors, all
the jurors consenting to such verdict shall sign the same.
ARK. CONST. of 1874, art. II, § 7, amended by ARK. CONST. amend. 16. According to the
court, "[t]his amendment ... clearly recognizes that a jury must consist of twelve jurors."
Philbrick, 189 Ark. at 1084, 76 S.W.2d at 97. The court also cited its earlier decision in
Minnequa Cooperage Co. v. Hendricks, 130 Ark. 264, 197 S.W. 280 (1917), which
prompted the constitutional amendment. Philbrick, 189 Ark. at 1084, 76 S.W.2d at 97. In
that case, the court held unconstitutional a statute providing for a verdict based on the con-
currence of nine of the twelve jurors. Minnequa, 130 Ark. at 268-69, 197 S.W. at 281-82. In
a case arising under the 1836 Constitution, the court observed that "[i]t is a well ascertained
fact, that the common law jury consisted of twelve men, and as a necessary consequence,
since the constitution is silent on the subject, the conclusion is irresistible that the framers ...
intended to require the same number." Larillian v. Lane & Co., 8 Ark. 372, 374-75 (1848).
292. Byrd v. State, 317 Ark. 609, 879 S.W.2d 434 (1994) (striking down statute allowing
six jurors in misdemeanor cases); see Timothy N. Holthoff, Note, Constitutional Law-
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Justice Hays dissented in the latter case, arguing that "every feature of the
jury as it existed at common law was not necessarily included in the term
'jury' found in Article 2, § 7 of the Arkansas Constitution., 293 The majority
disagreed and, in the process, expressly rejected the rationale of Williams v.
Florida,294 in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that the
Sixth Amendment did not require a twelve-member jury. The Williams
opinion described the common-law number as "a historical accident, unnec-
essary to effect the purposes of the jury system and wholly without signifi-
cance except to mystics. 295 Subsequently, the Court held in Colgrove v.
Battin 296 that the Seventh Amendment does not require twelve-person juries
in civil cases.
C. Examples of a More Flexible Approach
Among the decisions suggesting a less rigid historical view is Hopper
v. Garner,297 a usurpation-of-office case298 involving the city attorney of
Horseshoe Bend. Hopper filed the action against Garner requesting ouster of
Garner from the office of city attorney and the fees and emoluments he re-
ceived while serving in that capacity. The jury rendered a verdict for Gar-
ner. On appeal, Hopper argued that Garner was not entitled to a jury trial
under Article II, Section 7. The supreme court disagreed and affirmed.
Justice Imber, for a unanimous court, relied on Wheat v. Smith299 in
stating that "there was no common law right to a jury trial in usurpation-of-
office cases when the plaintiff merely requested ouster of the alleged
usurper. 300 According to the Wheat opinion, "the right did not extend at
common law to a civil proceeding in the nature of quo warranto against a
public officer," and the statute permitting suit for usurpation of office "does
not enlarge the right nor attempt to extend it to cases of this or a like na-
ture." 301 As Justice Imber pointed out, however, the court had suggested in
Wheat that "such a right might exist if the plaintiff also made a claim for
Twelve Angry People: Arkansas Constitution Guarantees Right to Trial by Jury of Twelve
Persons in Criminal Cases, 18 U. ARK. LIrrLE ROCK L.J. 489 (1996). In State v. Cox, 8 Ark.
436 (1848), the court concluded that the 1836 Constitution guaranteed a criminal defendant
"a jury of twelve men." Id. at 447.
293. Byrd, 317 Ark. at 616, 879 S.W.2d at 439 (Hays, J., dissenting).
294. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
295. Id. at 102 (internal quotation omitted).
296. 413 U.S. 149 (1973).
297. 328 Ark. 516,944 S.W.2d 540 (1997).
298. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-118-105(b) (Michie 1987). This provision dates to the Civil
Code. See CIVIL CODE, supra note 93, §§ 525-530.
299. 50 Ark. 267, 7 S.W. 161 (1887).
300. Hopper, 328 Ark. at 521,944 S.W.2d at 543.
301. 50 Ark. at 275, 7 S.W. at 164.
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fees and emoluments." 30 2 In expressly recognizing the right in Hopper, Jus-
tice Imber also relied on Louisiana & Northwest Railroad Co. v. State,30 3 a
1905 decision holding that there was a constitutional right to trial by jury in
a usurpation-of-franchise case in which the Attorney General had "re-
quested ouster and the return of the usurped property"-i.e., "the railroad
franchise and the contractual rights growing out of it. ' 3°4
Apparently anticipating this problem, Hopper argued that there was no
factual issue to be resolved by the jury because the parties had stipulated to
the amount of fees that Garner had earned.30 5 Justice Imber responded that
this did not matter. "Regardless of whether the amount of fees is liquidated
or disputed, the jury must still decide the underlying factual issue of who is
rightfully entitled to the office. 3 06 Consequently, she concluded that "the
trial court did not err when it granted Garner his constitutional right to a
jury trial in this case., 30 7
The court did not explain in Hopper why the jury must decide the "un-
derlying issue" of entitlement to the office, a question that would have been
resolved by a judge had no fees or emoluments been sought. Nor is any ex-
planation offered in the Wheat case. The Louisiana & Northwest Railroad
decision is grounded in the notion that "property in its highest sense is in-
volved" when a lawsuit seeks to terminate a corporate charter or franchise
and would impact "the manifold contractual rights growing out of them."'30°
This case undoubtedly supports recognition of a right to trial by jury in
usurpation of office cases if return of fees or emoluments is sought-such
funds constitute "property" even though the office itself does not.309 But it
does not inexorably follow that the jury must decide entitlement to the of-
fice when a claim for fees or emoluments is made.
The holding in Hopper that both issues are to be decided by the jury
can be viewed as a preference for trial by jury. Hopper is a mixed case in
the sense that it involved one issue that, standing alone, would be deter-
mined by a judge (entitlement to office) and another that must be decided by
a jury (fees and emoluments). The supreme court could presumably have
302. Hopper, 328 Ark. at 521, 944 S.W.2d at 543; see Wheat, 50 Ark. at 275, 7 S.W. at
164 (noting that "[n]o claim for fees or emoluments was made" in that case).
303. 75 Ark. 435, 88 S.W. 559 (1905).
304. Hopper, 328 Ark. at 521,944 S.W.2d at 543; see La. & Northwest R.R. Co., 75 Ark.
at 444, 88 S.W. at 562 ("In quo warranto proceedings at common law brought to vacate
charters, trial by jury seems universally to have been accorded to determine the facts.").
305. Hopper, 328 Ark. at 522,944 S.W.2d at 543.
306. Id., 944 S.W.2d at 543.
307. Id., 944 S.W.2d at 543.
308. 75 Ark. at 444, 88 S.W. at 562.
309. See id. at 443-44, 88 S.W. at 562 (pointing out that the United States Supreme Court
had held that "a public office was not property" and that neither fees nor emoluments had
been involved in Wheat).
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maintained this division of labor, particularly where, as in Hopper, the
amount of fees was undisputed. The choice not to do so arguably reflects a
preference for jury trial that could inform the court's thinking when it en-
counters mixed law and equity cases in the merged system.
A preference for trial by jury is expressly stated in Walker v. First
Commercial Bank.3'0 There the plaintiffs sued the defendant bank in Pulaski
County circuit court for lender liability, contending that their coal mining
business failed because the bank had made improper management decisions,
failed to provide promised long-term financing, and transferred funds with-
out authorization. The complaint included claims for breach of contract,
negligence, fraud, duress, and tortious interference. In its answer, the bank
asserted an equitable setoff and recoupment for the amount of the unpaid
loans owed by plaintiffs. On the basis of the equitable defense, the circuit
court transferred the case, over plaintiffs objections, to the chancery court,
which ultimately ruled in the bank's favor on the merits.3 '
The supreme court, in an opinion by Special Justice Chaney, 312 unani-
mously reversed, concluding that the setoff defense was not "exclusively
cognizable" in equity. 313 "The defense of setoff or recoupment is available
in the action at law for the liquidated sum owed by [plaintiffs] to [defen-
dant] for the unpaid loans which arose from the same lending relationship
between the parties that gave rise to [plaintiffs] lender liability claim. 3 14
Because there was "no peculiar equity ... that would mandate a transfer to
chancery," the plaintiffs "were wrongfully deprived of a jury trial on their
lender liability claim as guaranteed to them by Article 2, Section 7.''315
Justice Chaney also emphasized that the "right to jury trial is a funda-
mental constitutional right that is protected by the Constitution of Arkansas,
and procedural rules will not be applied to diminish [that] right. 3 16 He
added:
310. 317 Ark. 617, 880 S.W.2d 316 (1994).
311. Id. at 619-20, 880 S.W.2d at 317-18.
312. The governor appointed Donald Price Chaney, Jr., as special associate justice for
this case to serve in place of Justice Brown, who had recused. This practice was authorized
by Article VII, Section 9 of the 1874 Constitution. Amendment 80 repealed that provision,
but provides that the governor "shall commission a Special Justice" if a member of the su-
preme court "is disqualified or temporarily unable to serve." ARK. CONST. amend. 80,
§ 13(A). The governor may choose among "retired Justices or Judges, active Circuit or Dis-
trict Judges, or licensed attorneys" Id. § 13(D).
313. Walker, 317 Ark. at 620, 880 S.W.2d at 318. Under a statute that was originally part
of the Civil Code, either party in an action commenced at law "shall have the right, by mo-
tion, to have any issue, which before the adoption of this code was exclusively cognizable in
chancery, tried in the manner prescribed in this code in cases of equitable proceedings." ARK.
CODE ANN. § 16-57-106 (Michie 1987); see CIVIL CODE, supra note 93, § 10.
314. Walker, 317 Ark. at 622, 880 S.W.2d at 319.
315. Id., 880 S.W.2d at 319.
316. Id., 880 S.W.2d at 319. In support of this proposition, the court cited Bussey v. Bank
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A defendant may not assert an equitable counterclaim merely to avail
himself of chancery court jurisdiction and deprive the plaintiff of the
right to a trial by jury. It is only where an equitable defense is exclu-
sively cognizable in equity that a transfer to chancery should be author-
ized, which is not present here.
317
Setoff and recoupment have different origins. 318 The latter, which de-
veloped at common law, allowed the defendant in an action based on con-
tract to defeat or diminish the plaintiffs recovery by showing facts arising
from the transaction sued upon or related to the subject matter of the
claim. 319 Recoupment could be used only defensively, and the defendant
"could recover nothing for himself, whether plaintiffs claim stood or
fell, 320 even though "the claim recouped is greater in amount that the plain-
tiff's claim."321
As setoff initially emerged in equity, it was also a defensive mecha-
nism; by asserting it, the defendant "waived any excess over the plaintiffs
claim. 3 22 In early American law, however, the defendant was often allowed
32332an affirmative recovery, and this was so in Arkansas.324 From its incep-
of Malvern, 270 Ark. 37, 603 S.W.2d 426 (Ct. App. 1980), in which the court of appeals
rejected the argument that defendants had waived their right to a jury trial. Plaintiff had
argued that there had been a waiver because defendants failed to object to the trial judge's
erroneous reliance on cases decided before adoption of the Rules of Civil Procedure and did
not call to his attention to the change in the law. The court of appeals said:
We believe that the trial court erred in taking the case away from the jury and
that this case should be reversed irrespective of the fact that counsel for [defen-
dants] failed to object to the error. We agree with [defendants'] contention that
the right to jury trial is a constitutional right which is so fundamental that the
rule that cures error when counsel fails to object ought not to be readily applied
to the denial of rights protected in the Constitution of Arkansas and described
therein as "inviolate." Procedural rules governing jury trials are not intended to
diminish the right to a jury trial. These rules should be interpreted so as not to
give effect to dubious waivers of rights.
Id. at 43, 603 S.W.2d at 430 (citation omitted). The supreme court expressly approved
Bussey in two criminal cases holding that a contemporaneous objection is not required. See
Calnan v. State, 310 Ark. 744, 748-49, 841 S.W.2d 593, 596 (1992); Winkle v. State, 310
Ark. 713, 717, 841 S.W.2d 589, 591 (1992).
317. Walker, 317 Ark. at 622, 880 S.W.2d at 319.
318. See generally CLARK, supra note 55, § 100; FLEMING JAMES, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE
§ 10.14 (1965); 3 THEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES §§ 1030-
1040 (9th ed. 1913).
319. Originally, recoupment was "a deduction from damages because of part payment,
former recovery, or some analogous fact." JAMES, supra note 318, § 10.14.
320. Id.
321. SEDGWICK, supra note 318, § 1049; see, e.g., Brunson v. Martin, 17 Ark. 270, 271
(1856) (defendant asserting recoupment "cannot have a balance certified in his favor.., but
he must be content to have it go in abatement, in whole or in part of the plaintiff's demand").
322. JAMES, supra note 318, § 10.14.
323. Id.; see also SEDGWICK, supra note 318, § 1033 (distinguishing setoff and recoup-
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tion, equity allowed setoff under some circumstances even though the de-
fendant's claim was unrelated to the plaintiff's-if, for example, the plain-
tiff was insolvent or mutual debts existed.325 By virtue of English statutes
adopted in the early 1700s, setoff was also allowed in these situations in
actions at law.326 Equity thereafter confined the use of setoff in equitable
suits to those situations in which the demands, had they been legal, could
have been set off under the statutes, unless special equitable grounds for
relief were established.327 The English statutes, however, did not become
part of the common law of Arkansas.
328
Because the constitutional right to trial by jury applies "only to cases at
common law in which the issues of fact were triable by jury, 3 29 one can
argue that the right did not extend to matters asserted via setoff. If that is so,
then the Walker case represents a departure from a rigidly historical ap-
proach to Article II, Section 7. It is true that setoff was available as a de-
fense at law in Arkansas by 1818, thanks to a territorial statute applicable in
cases of mutual debt.330 A similar provision adopted by General Assembly
in 1837331 was replaced by a section of the 1869 Civil Code providing that a
setoff "can only be pleaded in an action founded on contract, and must be a
cause of action arising upon contract, or ascertained by the decision of a
court. 332 The latter was amended in 1917 to allow setoff, based on tort as
ment in that "defendant can have a balance certified in his favor" in the former but not the
latter).
324. Brunson, 17 Ark. at 271 ("[W]here a defendant elects to use his claim by way of
recoupment, he cannot have a balance certified in his favor, as in case of set-off.").
325. CLARK, supra note 55, § 100; see also Wheat v. Dotson, 12 Ark. 699, 703 (1852)
("[R]ecoupment differs from off-set... in being confined to matters only arising out of and
connected with the contract upon which the suit is brought.").
326. 4 Anne, c. 17, § 11 (1705) (suits by insolvents); 2 Geo. II, c. 22, § 23 (1729),
amended by 8 Geo. II, c. 24 (1735) (mutual debts).
327. CLARK, supra note 55, § 100.
328. Small v. Strong, 2 Ark. 198, 206 (1840). A territorial enactment from 1816, when
Arkansas was part of the Missouri Territory, adopted "[t]he common law of England, which
is of a general nature, and all statutes of the British Parliament in aid of, or to supply the
defects of, the said common law, made prior to the fourth year of James the First, and of a
general nature." STEELE & M'CAMPBELL, supra note 77, at 130. This provision remained in
force until statehood, and thereafter the Arkansas General Assembly passed a similar statute.
ARK. REV. STAT. ch 28, § 1 (1837). The present codification of the statute, ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 1-2-119 (Michie Repl. 1996), uses the date March 24, 1606, when the fourth year of the
reign of James I began. He became king on March 24, 1603. T.D. CRAWFORD & HAMILTON
MOSES, Note to ch. 1432, DIGEST OF THE STATUTES OF ARKANSAS 544 (1921).
329. Kirkland v. State, 72 Ark. 171, 177, 78 S.W. 770, 772 (1904).
330. STEELE & M'CAMPBELL, supra note 77, at 352-53; see Small, 2 Ark. at 206-07.
331. ARK. REV. STAT. ch. 139, § 1 (1837). On the equity side of the circuit court, setoffs
were allowed "[in suits for the payment or recovery of money ... in the same manner, and
with like effect, as in actions at law." Id. ch. 23, § 5.
332. CIvIL CODE, supra note 93, § 119.
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well as contract, "in any action for the recovery of money, 333 and this pro-
vision remains in effect today.334 As discussed previously, however, the
Arkansas Supreme Court has taken the position that there is no constitu-
tional right to a jury trial in statutory proceedings that did not exist at com-
mon law.335
There appear to have been no Arkansas statutes expressly permitting
setoff in actions at law on the basis of the plaintiff's insolvency. As early as
1909, however, the supreme court recognized that "the insolvency of the
party against whom the set-off is claimed is a sufficient ground for equitable
interference. 3 36 Sixty years later, in Poultry Growers, Inc. v. Westark Pro-
duction Credit Ass 'n,337 the court relied on this principle in holding that the
circuit court erred in denying a motion to transfer the case to chancery
where the defendants had pleaded equitable setoff.338 In Walker v. First
Commercial Bank, insolvency was also the asserted basis for the equitable
setoff and transfer from circuit court to chancery, but there the court held
that the transfer had "wrongfully deprived" the plaintiffs of their right to a
jury trial.339
The opinion in Walker can be read as holding either that (1) setoff is
available at law when the plaintiff is insolvent, thus offering the defendant
an adequate legal remedy and depriving the chancery court of jurisdiction,
or (2) this case really involved recoupment because the bank's claim arose
from the same transaction as the plaintiff's claim (the loan) or was at least
related to its subject matter (the lending relationship between the parties).
With respect to the latter, the court held that the setoff statute "is broad
enough to include both setoff and recoupment., 340 The court presumably
333. 1917 Ark. Acts 267, sec. 2.
334. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-63-206(a) (Michie 1987). Paragraph (d) of this statute, under
which a defendant who fails to setoff a debt against the plaintiff's demand is "barred from
recovering costs" in a subsequent suit on the debt, dates to 1837. ARK. REv. STAT. ch. 139,
§ 7 (1837).
335. E.g., Dunn v. Davis, 291 Ark. 492,495, 725 S.W.2d 853, 855 (1987); see supra text
accompanying notes 282-90.
336. Ewing-Merkel Elec. Co. v. Lewisville Light & Water Co., 92 Ark. 594, 597, 124
S.W. 509, 510 (1909) (quoting N. Chicago Rolling-Mill Co. v. St. Louis Ore & Steel Co.,
152 U.S. 596, 616 (1894)). The court also adopted the traditional view that "'the non-
residence of the party against whom the set-off is asserted is good ground for equitable re-
lief.""Id.
337. 246 Ark. 995, 440 S.W.2d 531 (1969).
338. Id. at 1000-01, 440 S.W.2d at 533-34.
339. 317 Ark. 617, 622, 880 S.W.2d 316,319 (1994).
340. Id. at 621, 880 S.W.2d at 318. The court suggested in Walker that it had not previ-
ously distinguished recoupment and setoff. Id. That is not so. For example, in Brunson v.
Martin, 17 Ark. 270 (1856), the court said that "where a defendant elects to use his claim by
way of recoupment, he cannot have a balance certified in his favor, as in case of set-off." Id.
at 271 (emphasis in original). In Wheat v. Dotson, 12 Ark. 699 (1852), the court stated that
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considered this construction necessary because the common law permitted
recoupment only as a defensive measure, while setoff is not so limited.34'
The bank would have no doubt preferred to recover a judgment on its
note in Walker had the plaintiffs lender liability claim proved unsuccess-
ful. 342 Also, recoupment at common law was available only when the plain-
tiff had sued in contract, while the statute allows setoff "in any action for
the recovery of money. 3 43 More importantly for present purposes, the no-
tion that setoff is available at law is at odds with Arkansas history and re-
quires trial by jury under circumstances in which such a right did not exist
at common law. This result, considered in light of the broad language from
the opinion quoted above, suggests a preference for trial by jury.344
In addition to the Hopper and Walker cases, the supreme court has
adopted a flexible historical approach with respect to bifurcation of issues
for trial, a procedure unknown at common law 345 but familiar in courts of
"recoupment differs from off-set.., in being confined to matters only arising out of and
connected with the contract upon which the suit is brought, and in having no regard to'
whether or not such matters be liquidated or unliquidated." Id. at 703.
341. Brunson, 17 Ark. at 271.
342. On remand after the supreme court's decision and transfer to circuit court, a jury
returned a $22.5 million verdict for the plaintiffs. The trial judge reduced this amount by a
setoff of $7.3 million and ordered a remittitur of $7 million, the result being a judgment of
$8.2 million. The supreme court reversed, holding that plaintiff business entities lacked ca-
pacity and that the individual plaintiff did not have standing, either as a stockholder or guar-
antor, to pursue the various causes of action asserted. First Commercial Bank v. Walker, 333
Ark. 100, 104, 969 S.W.2d 146, 148 (1998).
343. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-63-206(a) (Michie 1987). Prior to 1917, the plaintiff's cause
of action had to be "founded on contract." CIVIL CODE supra note 93, § 119.
344. Perhaps the broadest statement in Walker is that "[a] defendant may not assert an
equitable counterclaim merely to avail himself of chancery court jurisdiction and deprive the
plaintiff of the right to a trial by jury." 317 Ark. at 622, 880 S.W.2d at 319. For this proposi-
tion, the court cited Axley v. Hammock, 185 Ark. 939, 50 S.W.2d 608 (1932), but that case
does not go nearly so far. Axley was a slander action in which the defendant asserted a coun-
terclaim for wrongful appropriation of funds and asking for an accounting. On the defen-
dant's motion and over the plaintiffs objection, the circuit court transferred the case to chan-
cery. The supreme court granted the plaintiffs petition for a writ of certiorari, holding that
the chancery court "has no jurisdiction in a slander suit." Id. at 946, 50 S.W.2d at 611. More-
over, the defendant had set out what appeared to be a permissive counterclaim, and the perti-
nent statute did not require that the cause of action set out in the counterclaim arise out of the
same transaction or occurrence as the plaintiffs action. If the assertion of a permissive coun-
terclaim required a transfer to chancery, the statute "would violate the Constitution." Id. at
945, 50 S.W. at 611. It was in this context that the court said that
[t]he right to trial by jury would not remain inviolate if, in an action only cogni-
zable in a court of law, the defendant could interpose defenses and cause a trans-
fer to a court of chancery, and thereby deprive the plaintiff of the right to trial by
jury, and the defendant cannot secure a transfer to chancery of a case of which
the court of chancery has no jurisdiction.
Id. at 946, 50 S.W.2d at 611.
345. Margaret M. Gammill, Note, Civil Procedure Rule 42(b)-Bifurcation of the Issues
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equity.346 Since the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in
1938, the procedure has been available in the federal courts, regardless of
whether the case is legal, equitable, or "mixed." Rule 42(b), as amended in
1966, provides that "[t]he court in furtherance of convenience or to avoid
prejudice, or when separate trials will be conducive to expedition and econ-
omy, may order a separate trial of ... any separate issue. 34 7 The corre-
sponding Arkansas rule contains this same language.
348
The federal rule has withstood a challenge that bifurcation violates the
Seventh Amendment. The leading case is Hosie v. Chicago & Northwestern
Railway Co., 349 a personal injury action in which the trial judge ordered
separate trials on the issues of liability and damages. 350 In the liability phase
of the trial, the jury returned a verdict for the defendant railroad. On appeal,
the plaintiff argued, among other things, that the trial court's use of bifurca-
tion violated his constitutional right to trial by jury. The Seventh Circuit
disagreed, holding that "the essential character of a trial by jury was pre-
served." The court added that "the Seventh Amendment does not require the
retention of all the old forms of procedure; nor does it prohibit the introduc-
tion of new methods for ascertaining what facts are in issue. 351
In support of this proposition, the court cited Gasoline Products Co. v.
Champlin Refining Co.,352 which addressed the constitutionality of a partial
remand after appeal. The defendant, Champlin, had prevailed on a counter-
of Liability and Damages and Trial, 5 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 405,406 (1982) (finding no
bifurcation of liability and damages at common law). Apparently the only situation in bifur-
cation was permitted at law was in the action for account-render. By Blackstone's time,
however, the procedure had become complicated and "lapsed into disuse." Lewis Mayers,
The Severance for Trial of Liability from Damage, 86 U. PA. L. REV. 389, 392 (1938). Its
decline was "in the main contemporaneous with the development of the equitable action for
an account; and Blackstone indeed assigns the procedural superiority of the equitable action
as the reason for the decline of the action at law." Id.
346. Steven S. Gensler, Bifurcation Unbound, 75 WASH. L. REv. 705, 715 (2000).
347. FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b). The 1966 amendment added the provision authorizing a sepa-
rate trial when "conducive to expedition and economy," as well as a clause directing the
court, in ordering separate trials, to "always preserv[e] inviolate the right of trial by jury as
declared by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution or given by a statute of the United
States." 9 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 31, at 426 n. 1. The original version of the rule was
derived from Federal Equity Rule 29, statutes in New York and California, and two models
rules advocated by the American Judicature Society. Note, Separate Trials on Liability and
Damages in "Routine Cases ": A Legal Analysis, 46 MINN. L. REv. 1059, 1061 (1962).
348. ARK. R. Civ. P. 42(b). The Arkansas rule lacks a clause corresponding to the federal
rule's admonition regarding the right to trial by jury. See supra note 347. The Reporter's
Notes accompanying the Arkansas rule shed no light on this omission.
349. 282 F.2d 639 (7th Cir. 1960).
350. Id. at 640. The trial court acted pursuant to a local rule based on Rule 42(b) but that
specifically referred to personal injury cases. Id. at 640 & n. 1.
351. Id. at 643.
352. 283 U.S. 494 (1931).
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claim, but the First Circuit Court of Appeals held that the trial judge had
given an erroneous instruction on damages. Instead of remanding the entire
case for a new trial, the appellate court left intact the liability finding and
remanded for a retrial limited to the issue of damages. The Supreme Court
agreed with Champlin that the partial remand was invalid because "the
question of damages on the counterclaim is so interwoven with that of li-
ability that the former cannot be submitted to the jury independently of the
latter without confusion and uncertainty, which would amount to a denial of
a fair trial. 35 3
However, the Court squarely rejected the argument that the partial re-
mand was a per se violation of the Seventh Amendment, even thou "at
common law there was no practice of setting aside a verdict in part." '4 The
Seventh Amendment, the Court said, "does not exact the retention of old
forms of procedure. 355 Moreover, it
does not prohibit the introduction of new methods for ascertaining what
facts are in issue. . . or require that an issue once correctly determined,
in accordance with the constitutional command, be tried a second time,
even though justice demands that another distinct issue, because errone-
ously determined, must again be passed on by a jury.356
Relying on Hosie, the Arkansas Supreme Court held in Hunter v.
McDaniel Construction Co.357 that the bifurcation of liability and damages
in a personal injury action did not infringe on the right to trial by jury guar-
anteed by Article II, Section 7.35 In addition to citing Hosie, the court
pointed out that Arkansas Rule 42(b) is based on the corresponding federal
rule and that trying the liability issue separately from damages "is common
in the federal practice. 3 59 Three justices dissented on this point, arguing
that "[t]he chief evil resulting from the severance of the liability claim from
the damage claim is that it is likely to cause the jury to be prone to generally
find in favor of the defendant in order to prevent a second trial on the dam-
ages.,, 360 This statement reflects the notion, expressed by other critics of
bifurcation, that the procedure fundamentally alters the nature of the jury
trial that had existed at common law.361
353. Id. at 500.
354. Id. at 497.
355. Id. at 498.
356. Id.
357. 274 Ark. 178, 623 S.W.2d 196 (1981).
358. Id. at 180, 623 S.W.2d at 198.
359. Id., 623 S.W.2d at 198.
360. Id. at 183-84, 623 S.W.2d at 200 (Purtle, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Adkisson and
Justice Hays joined Justice Purtle's dissent. Id. at 184, 623 S.W.2d at 200 (Purtle, J., dissent-
ing).
361. E.g., Jack B. Weinstein, Routine Bifurcation of Jury Negligence Trials: An Example
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Had the Arkansas Supreme Court applied a strict historical test, it
could easily have invalidated Rule 42(b). As Gasoline Products indicates,
the common law did not permit a verdict to be set aside in part. This has
long been the rule in Arkansas; a verdict is "the foundation of the judgment
at law and cannot be divided by the court., 3 62 This view has prevailed de-
spite adoption of Rule 59(a) of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure,
which, as initially promulgated, provided that a new trial could be granted
"on all or part of the issues.93 63 The rule was amended in 1994 after the
court made clear in Smith v. Walt Bennett Ford, Inc.3 64 that it was unwilling
to abandon the concept that the verdict is an indivisible entity.365 That being
so, the court's decision in Hunter is certainly consistent with the more flexi-
ble historical approach to the right to trial by jury employed by the United
States Supreme Court.
Finally, mention should be made of cases involving procedural devices
that were developed in equity. In contrast to Hames v. Cravens, which held
that a shareholder derivative suit could be brought only in chancery, the
supreme court made plain prior to merger that interpleader, another creature
of equity, was available in circuit as well as chancery courts. In Cessna Fi-
nance Corp. v. Skelton,366 the appellant sought garnishment in circuit court
with respect to funds held by the county sheriff, who subsequently filed a
separate interpleader action in chancery naming the appellant, as well as
others, as possible claimants. The garnishment case was then transferred to
chancery on the sheriffs motion. On appeal, the supreme court held that the
transfer was proper under "the general rule that interpleader takes prece-
dence over actions filed earlier involving the same subject matter.13 67 How-
ever, the court also stated that "the sheriff could have had his interpleader as
of the Questionable Use of Rule Making Power, 14 VAND. L. REv. 831, 832-34 (1961).
362. Smith v. Walt Bennett Ford, Inc., 314 Ark. 591, 608, 864 S.W.2d 817, 827 (1993).
Consequently, an appellate court in Arkansas "will not affirm a judgment on the issue of
liability and remand for a partial new trial on the issues of damages." Id., 864 S.W.2d at 827;
see also Avery v. Ward, 326 Ark. 829, 837, 934 S.W.2d 516, 521 (1996); Johnson v.
Gilliland, 320 Ark. 1, 9, 896 S.W.2d 856, 860 (1995); Jacuzzi Bros., Inc. v. Todd, 316 Ark.
785, 791, 875 S.W.2d 67, 70 (1994); McVay v. Cowger, 276 Ark. 385, 386, 635 S.W.2d 249,
250 (1982) (collecting cases dating to 1900). However, a new trial can on occasion be
avoided by remittitur if the reversible error "relates to a separable item of damages." Jaccuzi
Bros., 316 Ark. at 791, 875 S.W.2d at 70.
363. ARK. R. Civ. P. 59(a), reprinted in 3A ARK. STAT. ANN. app. 425 (Bobbs-Merrill
Repl. 1979).
364. 314 Ark. 591,608, 864 S.W.2d 817, 827 (1993).
365. See Addition to Reporter's Notes, 1994 amendment, Ark. R. Civ. P. 59.
366. 287 Ark. 378, 700 S.W.2d 44(1985).




a defendant in the circuit court garnishment action" pursuant to Rule 22 of
the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure.368
Intervention, another historically equitable device, was employed be-
fore merger to assert claims for damages in circuit court.36 9 Similarly, class
actions, which developed in equity, were routinely brought in circuit court
when legal relief was sought.370 This practice in general and the Cessna
decision in particular suggest, as the Supreme Court held in Ross, that the




While some agree with Blackstone's praise of trial by jury,372 the insti-
tution has long been criticized; Mark Twain, for example, described "one of
those sorrowful farces, in Virginia, which we call a jury trial., 373 Judge
Jerome Frank, a noted critic of the system, 374 said in an opinion more than
fifty years ago that "the jury ...has infinite capacity for mischief, for
368. Id., 700 S.W.2d at 46. This position is consistent with the Reporter's Notes accom-
panying Rule 22, which state in pertinent part:
Prior Arkansas law required interpleader actions to be brought in chancery court.
The decisions under FRCP 22 make it clear that an interpleader is equitable in
nature. Under this rule, however, interpleader actions are not limited to courts of
equity.
Reporter's Notes, ARK. R. Civ. P. 22 (citations omitted). Well before adoption of the rules,
the Arkansas Supreme Court rejected an argument that interpleader proceedings in chancery
resulted in a denial of the right to trial by jury. In Dennis v. Equitable Life Assurance Society,
191 Ark. 825, 88 S.W.2d 76 (1935), a widow claiming benefits under her husband's group
life insurance policy brought suit against the insurance company in circuit court. The com-
pany asked that its answer be treated as an interpleader and moved for a transfer to chancery.
The motion was granted, and the chancery court ruled in favor of the widow but did not
require the insurance company to pay the statutory penalty or attorney's fees. The widow
argued on appeal that she had been denied a jury trial. The supreme court rejected this argu-
ment as "without merit," pointing out that the insurance company had "made no dispute as to
its liability for the fund, and was not attempting in any respect to defeat a recovery thereof."
Id. at 833, 88 S.W.2d at 80.
369. E.g., E. Tex. Motor Freight Lines, Inc. v. Freeman, 289 Ark. 539, 713 S.W.2d 456
(1986).
370. E.g., SEECO, Inc. v. Hales, 341 Ark. 672, 22 S.W.3d 157 (2000).
371. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 541 n.15 (1970).
372. E.g., Arnold, supra note 11, at 2 ("I should begin by admitting that I am for ju-
ries.... I believe that juries are a good thing in civil cases and in criminal cases, in complex
matters as well as simple ones."). See generally J. KENDALL FEW, IN DEFENSE OF TRIAL BY
JURY (1993) (collecting materials).
373. MARK TWAIN, ROUGHING IT 320 (Harriet E. Smith & Edgar M. Branch, eds., 1993).
Twain added that trial by jury "would prove the most ingenious and infallible agency for
defeating justice that human wisdom could contrive." Id. (emphasis in original).
374. See generally JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 108-25 (1949).
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twelve men can easily misunderstand more law in a minute than the judge
can explain in an hour."375 Professor James, writing shortly before the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure brought about the merger of law and equity in
the federal courts, argued that the right to trial by jury "should not be ex-
panded" and if anything "should be cut down" because "[tihis method of
settling disputes is expensive and dilatory-perhaps anachronistic." 376 More
recently, juries have been under fire for large verdicts that "establish de
facto public policy.
377
Since merger of law and equity in the federal courts, however, the Su-
preme Court has applied the Seventh Amendment with a decided preference
toward trial by jury. This rejection of a rigid historical approach is arguably
sound. As the authors of a leading federal practice treatise have observed,
"one of the drawbacks of defining any right to a jury trial according to 1791
practices is that it allows a constitutional right to be defined in terms of an
historical accident., 378 Put more colorfully, "[a]sking how 1791 England
would deal with a [complex modem] case is a little like asking how the War
of the Roses would have turned out if both sides had airplanes. 379
On the other hand, employment of some sort of historical test seems
necessary if courts are "to honor the language of the constitutional man-
date., 380 In Arkansas, the attitude of the supreme court toward jury trials
will undoubtedly influence its decision as to whether such a test will be ap-
plied rigidly or flexibly with respect to the application of Article II, Section
7 in the merged system. 38 1 In other contexts, that attitude has not been uni-
form.382 A second factor could be that while the Arkansas Constitution ex-
375. Skidmore v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 167 F.2d 54, 60 (2d Cir. 1948); see also A.F.
Triplett, Trial by Jury-A Farce, 7 ARK. L. REv. 215, 222-23 (1953) (criticizing jury as
unable to "apply the law properly to the facts which are in dispute," unfamiliar with "techni-
cal subject[s]" it may be called upon to decide, untrained to "determine the weight to be
given any particular evidence," and "prone to allow sympathy or passion to enter into the
verdict").
376. Fleming James, Jr., Trial by Jury and the New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 45
YALE L.J. 1022, 1026 (1936).
377. Mark Curriden, Power of Twelve, A.B.A. J., Aug. 2001 at 36, 37. This article quotes
a corporate general counsel as describing juries as "the least informed, the least represented
and the least qualified body to determine public policy." Id. at 38. According to a law school
dean, "[olur founding fathers would be stunned and dismayed to learn of the issues that
today's juries are deciding." Id. at 37.
378. 9 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 31, § 2302.
379. Klein, supra note 37, at 1028.
380. 9 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 31, § 2302.
381. It has been suggested that "an unarticulated evaluation of the jury system" lies
"[bleneath the surface of the historical arguments" and that courts can be criticized for their
"failure to acknowledge frankly the significance of unresolved arguments for and against the
jury system and to consider them openly as grounds for expanding or contracting the jury's
role." Note, The Right to a Nonjury Trial, 74 HARV. L. REv. 1176, 1190 (1961).
382. For example, the supreme court has held that a contemporaneous objection is un-
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pressly recognizes the right to trial by jury, there is no corresponding right
to a nonjury trial.383 The same is true with respect to the federal constitution,
necessary to preserve for appeal the argument that the right to trial by jury had not been
waived. Calnan v. State, 310 Ark. 744, 748-49, 841 S.W.2d 593, 596 (1992); Winkle v.
State, 310 Ark. 713, 717, 841 S.W.2d 589, 591 (1992). This is so despite the court's steadfast
adherence to the contemporaneous objection rule and refusal to recognize the so-called
"plain error" doctrine that permits appellate review of decisions affecting substantial rights
even though the appellant failed to bring the matter to the trial court's attention. See, e.g.,
Smith v. State, 343 Ark. 552, 574, 39 S.W.3d 739, 753 (2001). As the court explained in
Calnan, there are four exceptions to the contemporaneous objection requirement, one of
which applies "when a trial court should intervene on its own motion to correct a serious
error." 310 Ark. at 748, 841 S.W.2d at 596. The court found this exception controlling with
respect to a purported waiver of the right to trial by jury, a right "so fundamental that if it is
denied a serious error results." Id. at 749, 841 S.W.2d at 596. Although Calnan is a criminal
case, the court specifically approved a decision of the court of appeals reaching the same
result in a civil action. See Bussey v. Bank of Malvem, 270 Ark. 37, 43, 603 S.W.2d 426,
430 (Ct. App. 1980).
On the other hand, the supreme court has rejected attempts of litigants to obtain imme-
diate appellate review of the trial court's denial of their right to trial by jury. Because an
order refusing a jury trial does not terminate the action, it is not final and thus unappealable.
Wright v. City of Little Rock, 245 Ark. 355, 356-57, 432 S.W.2d 488, 489 (1968). Similarly,
before merger of law and equity a party had to wait until final judgment to challenge on
appeal a transfer from circuit court to chancery or the chancellor's refusal to transfer to cir-
cuit court. Dalrymple v. Simmons First Nat'l Bank, 296 Ark. 534, 536, 758 S.W.2d 5, 6
(1988); Smith v. Pinnell, 107 Ark. 185, 188, 154 S.W. 497, 499 (1913). Moreover, the writ
of prohibition is unavailable to secure immediate appellate review of a trial court's decision
to proceed without a jury. In McClendon v. Wood, 125 Ark. 155, 188 S.W. 6 (1916), the
court said that such a ruling "constitutes only an error or an irregularity which must be cor-
rected by appeal," since "[t]he jurisdiction of the court itself is undoubted." Id. at 158, 188
S.W. at 7; accord Hester v. Langston, 297 Ark. 87, 89, 759 S.W.2d 797, 798 (1988); see also
First Ark. Leasing Corp. v. Munson, 282 Ark. 359, 361, 668 S.W.2d 543, 544 (1984) (hold-
ing that a writ of prohibition "cannot be used as a remedy to transfer between law and equity
courts" and proper remedy "is by appeal after the matter proceeds to a final judgment").
These cases do not attach much significance to the right to trial by jury, particularly in light
of other decisions allowing use of the writ of prohibition to challenge a trial court's determi-
nation that venue is proper. E.g., Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n v. Harkey, 345 Ark. 279, 283,
45 S.W.3d 829, 832 (2001).
383. There appear to be no Arkansas cases directly on point. At times, however, the
Arkansas Supreme Court has overturned a judgment on the ground that the trial judge had
erroneously held a jury trial when there was no right to one under Article II, Section 7. E.g.,
Civil Serv. Comm'n of Van Buren v. Matlock, 205 Ark. 286, 168 S.W.2d 424 (1943). In
Matlock, the Van Buren Civil Service Commission reduced the rank of Mr. Matlock from
chief of police to patrolman. He challenged that action in circuit court, as provided by statute.
The judge, over the commission's objection, empaneled a jury. Upon a verdict for Matlock,
the judge set aside the commission's order. The supreme court reversed, agreeing with the
commission that the matter should not have been submitted to a jury: "the proceeding author-
ized by the act of the legislature under consideration here is not a common-law proceeding,
and neither party to such a proceeding was entitled to a jury." Id. at 290, 168 S.W.2d at 426.
The court added that "appellants had a right, under the law, to have this case heard and de-
termined by the court, and not by a jury, and the lower court erred in submitting the case,
over the objection of the appellants, to the jury for trial." Id., 168 S.W.2d at 426. Although
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as the Supreme Court pointed out in the course of adopting a flexible ap-
proach in Beacon Theatres. 394
Another consideration might be the distinct roles that law and equity
courts have played throughout the state's history. The New Jersey Supreme
Court, for example, has taken this factor into account in rejecting the flexi-
ble approach reflected in Beacon Theatres and Dairy Queen: "New Jersey's
legal history and traditions ... have placed a greater emphasis on the dis-
tinct roles of its law and chancery courts. 38 5 By contrast, the Maryland Su-
preme Court adopted the federal model after merger even though "the his-
torical separation of law and equity had been scrupulously maintained in
this State.
386
In construing other constitutional provisions, the Arkansas Supreme
Court has exhibited a willingness to avoid artificially freezing the law as it
existed when the Constitution of 1874 was adopted. For example, in White
v. City of Newport,38 1 the appellant challenged the constitutionality of the
municipal tort immunity statute, 388 arguing that in 1874 "a citizen had a
common-law right to sue a city for negligence committed while the city was
acting in a proprietary capacity." 389 The immunity statute, she claimed, ran
afoul of the constitutional guarantee of "a certain remedy in the laws for all
the last quoted sentence contains broad language, it does not recognize a constitutional right
to a nonjury trial. Rather, the court held that this was not a case in which Article II, Section 7
guaranteed a trial by jury and that the legislature had not provided by statute for that type of
proceeding. Submitting the matter to the jury was thus reversible error.
Most state courts have not construed their constitutions to include the right to a nonjury
trial. E.g., Mehau v. Reed, 869 P.2d 1320, 1330 (Haw. 1994); State v. Siemer, 454 N.W.2d
858, 865 (Iowa 1990); Luppino v. Gray, 647 A.2d 429, 437 (Md. 1994); Charles River
Constr. Co. v. Kirksey, 480 N.E.2d 315, 319 (Mass. Ct. App. 1985); Farese v. McGarry, 568
A.2d 89, 92 n.1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989); see also Note, supra note 381, at 1178-79.
However, a few older cases hold that legislatures cannot eliminate the trial of equitable is-
sues by the court. E.g., Brown v. Kalamazoo Circuit Judge, 42 N.W. 827 (Mich. 1889); State
v. Nieuwenhuis, 207 N.W. 77 (S.D. 1926); Callanan v. Judd, 23 Wis. 343 (1868). These
cases are all based on the notion that "the power of judges to decide issues of fact incidental
to equitable actions [is] inherent in the constitutionally vested judicial power." Note, supra
note 381, at 1178. The Nieuwenhuis case was overruled in 1982. See Black v. Gardner, 320
N.W.2d 153 (S.D. 1982).
Rule 39(b) of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "[i]ssues not de-
manded for trial by jury... shall be tried by the court," although the judge may in his or her
discretion order a jury trial "in an action in which such a demand might have been made of
right." ARK. R. CIv. P. 39(b). Courts in other jurisdictions have held that the first phrase does
not mean that there is a constitutional right to a nonjury trial. E.g., Charles River Constr.,
480 N.E.2d at 319.
384. 359 U.S. 500, 510 (1959).
385. Lyn-Anna Props., Ltd. v. Harborview Dev. Corp., 678 A.2d 683, 689 (N.J. 1996).
386. Higgins v. Barnes, 530 A.2d 724, 728 (Md. 1987).
387. 326 Ark. 667, 933 S.W.2d 800 (1996).
388. ARK. CODE ANN. § 21-9-301 (LEXIS Supp. 2001).
389. 326 Ark. at 671, 933 S.W.2d at 802.
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injuries or wrongs he may receive in his person, property or character" 390
and the prohibition against laws that limit "the amount to be recovered for
injuries resulting in death or for injuries to persons or property. 391 The su-
preme court disagreed. An "inflexible application" of these provisions
"crystallizes all common law rights of action, putting them beyond the reach
of legislative change to meet new conditions."
392
A strict historical analysis of Article II, Section 7 would seem at odds
with what the supreme court has described as one of the "fundamental pur-
poses" of Amendment 80, i.e., the merger of law and equity.393 To be sure,
use of any historical test to determine the scope of the constitutional right to
trial by jury assures the continuing relevance of equity practice despite
merger; to borrow Professor Chafee's famous phrase, the guarantee of jury
trial "is the sword in the bed that prevents the complete union of law and
equity. 394 However, a flexible historical analysis dulls that sword to some
extent and is more consistent with Amendment 80's modernization of the
Arkansas judiciary.
390. ARK. CONST. art. II, § 13.
391. ARK. CONST. art. V, § 32. Amendment 26, approved by the voters in 1938, modified
this provision by expressly authorizing the General Assembly "to enact laws prescribing the
amount of compensation to be paid by employers for injuries to or death of employees." Id.
at amend. 26; see Young v. G.L. Tarlton, Contractor, Inc., 204 Ark. 283, 288, 162 S.W.2d
477,479(1942).
392. White, 326 Ark. at 671, 933 S.W.2d at 802. The court took the latter quotation from
Justice George Rose Smith's dissenting opinion in Emberson v. Buffington, 228 Ark. 120,
129, 306 S.W.2d 326, 331 (1957).
393. In re Implementation of Amendment 80, supra note 1; see also Clark v. Farmers
Exch., Inc., 347 Ark. 81, 83 n.1, 61 S.W.3d 140, 141 n.1 (2001) (stating that "law and equity
have been merged"); Gray v. City of Billings, 689 P.2d 268, 272 (Mont. 1984) ("The modem
merger of law and equity courts and the liberal joinder provisions of our Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure force reevaluation of the traditional justification for permitting an equity court to
decide legal issues.").
394. ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR. & EDWARD D. RE, CASES & MATERIALS ON EQUITY 24 (5th
ed. 1967). The Arkansas Supreme Court made this point more than a century ago: "A com-
plete amalgamation of law and equity is impossible so long as the jury trial is retained."
Ashley v. Little Rock, 56 Ark. 370, 375, 19 S.W. 1058, 1059 (1892).
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